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Does Class Arbitration "Change the
Nature" of Arbitration?
Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a
Return to First Principles
by S.I. STRONG*
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the United
States Supreme Court stated that class arbitration"changes the nature of arbitration,"an idea that was also reflected in the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.
Certainly class proceedingsdo not resemble the traditionalview of arbitration as a swift, simple, and pragmatic bilateralprocedure with
few witnesses, documents, or formalities, but do these types of largescale disputes violate the fundamental nature of the arbitralprocedure? This article answers that question by considering the jurisprudential nature of arbitrationand determining whether and to what
extent class arbitrationfails to meet the standardsnecessary for a process to qualify as "arbitration."During the course of the discussion,
the article analyzes the ways in which class arbitrationdiffers from
other forms of multiparty arbitrationand investigates whether a form
of "quasi-arbitration"is in the process of developing as a means of
respondingto the demands of class proceedings.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A.

The Question Arises

In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the
United States Supreme Court stated that class arbitration (sometimes called "class action arbitration" or "classwide arbitration")
"changes the nature of arbitration."' On the one hand, this conclusion
1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
The procedural posture of this case is somewhat complicated and could lead to questions as to whether Stolt-Nielsen constitutes a class or consolidated proceeding. The
matter arose when a number of charterers filed a series of class actions in different
U.S. federal courts, alleging civil antitrust violations against several international
shipping companies. The charter parties in question included arbitration agreements,
and the defendant in one of the lawsuits moved to compel arbitration. A federal appellate court ultimately determined that the agreement was binding and that those particular claims should proceed in arbitration. However, while the appeal on that
proceeding was pending, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated
the various lawsuits into a single action. As a result of the various judgments and
orders, the parties in the now-consolidated proceeding agreed that the dispute must
be heard in arbitration, although they did not agree as to whether class or individual
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may be little more than empty rhetoric, given the Court's ruling, just
one year prior, that "objections centered on the nature of arbitration
do not offer a credible basis for discrediting the choice of that forum."2
On the other hand, references to the statement about class arbitration ostensibly changing the nature of arbitration have already begun
to appear in judicial decisions and commentary,3 including the Supreme Court's recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.4
Certainly class proceedings do not resemble the traditional view
of arbitration as a swift, simple, and pragmatic bilateral procedure
with few witnesses, documents, or formalities. However, it is by no
means clear that this classic model of arbitration still holds true in
all or even most instances. 5 Instead, the term "arbitration" has been
arbitration was warranted. Instead, they referred that question to an arbitral tribunal by special agreement. However, the fact that the various actions were judicially
consolidated is ultimately irrelevant because all of the underlying actions were class
actions. Thus, Stolt-Nielsen is correctly considered to be a class arbitration, not a consolidated arbitration. Furthermore, because several of the respondents were based
outside the United States, the dispute constitutes an international class arbitration.
See S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. ArbitratorsCreating Internationally
EnforceableAwards When OrderingClass Arbitrationin Cases of ContractualSilence
or Ambiguity?, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1021 (2009) [hereinafter Strong, Sounds of
Silence] (defining international class arbitrations).
2. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1471 (2009). Among other
things, the Supreme Court in Pyett condemned old-style judicial hostility to arbitration. Id. Interestingly, many of the arguments that are condemned in Pyett as belonging to an earlier era appear to be adopted by the majority in Stolt-Nielsen, suggesting
that the current animosity towards class arbitration is perhaps out of step with other
areas of arbitration law and may eventually wane with time. Compare id., with StoltNielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775-76.
3. Hicks v. Cadle Co., 355 F. App'x 186, 197 (10th Cir. 2009); Anwar v. Fairfield
Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 462, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers,
Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); McArdle v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. C
09-1117 CW, 2010 WL 2867305, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2010), leave to file for reconsiderationgranted by 2010 WL 2179161 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2010), grantinga further
stay, 2010 WL 2867305 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (awaiting the outcome of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010)); Dominic J. Campisi, FiduciaryLiability, Paper in the course book from the ALI-ABA program, REPRESENTING ESTATE
AND TRUST BENEFICIARIES AND FIDUCIARIES CS004 ALI-ABA 7 (July 15-16, 2010); Jill
I. Gross, Arbitration Case Law Update 2010, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2010, 1829
PLI/CORP. 111, 119 (Aug. 11, 2010) Philip J. Loree, Jr., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. Delivers A
New FAA Rule - And Then Federalizes the Law of Contracts, 28 ALT. HIGH Cost Lit.
121 (June 2010).
4. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).
5. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1746 (2009)
(discussing varying degrees of formality in arbitration). Although traditionalists often
point to a mythical "golden age" of arbitration in which pragmatism rather than legalism prevailed, it is unclear whether such an era ever actually existed. See Dennis R.
Nolan, Disputatio: "CreepingLegalism" as a Declension Myth, 2010 J. DisP. RESOL. 1,
3-7 (2010).
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used to describe a wide variety of processes, both bilateral and
multilateral. 6
Indeed, the flexibility inherent in arbitration is precisely what
makes Stolt-Nielsen's conclusion that class arbitration "changes the
nature of arbitration"'7 so troubling, since the statement is based on
the unspoken premise that the nature of arbitration is something
that can be both defined and universally agreed upon. This conclusion is particularly problematic because the jurisprudential nature of
class arbitration has not been discussed with any rigor, academically
or judicially. 8
However, as recent events show, inquiries into the nature of
class arbitration are not simply academic exercises; instead, this issue can have a significant real-world effect.9 Indeed, it has long been
recognized that the determination that a procedure is not "arbitration" can have widespread legal ramifications.10
This article therefore tests various assumptions about the nature
of class arbitration as well as the conclusion that class arbitration
falls outside established parameters regarding what constitutes "arbitration." The inquiry proceeds as follows. Section II lays the
6. In fact, procedures that are common in one sub-specialty often bear little resemblance to those used in other types of disputes. Thus, for example, domestic U.S.
labor arbitration is very different from international commercial arbitration, just as
online arbitration varies significantly from arbitration conducted by the Iran-U.S.
Claims Tribunal. See BORN, supra note 5, at 217-46, 1744; JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1fl 3-1 to 3-59 (2003); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV.
383, 385-87 (2008) (differentiating between "mass" and "custom" arbitration).
7. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
8. Justice Breyer himself noted that the majority in AT&T did not explain how
it arrived at the conclusion "that individual, rather than class, arbitration is a 'fundamental attribut[e]' of arbitration." AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. As discussed further below, the unspoken assumption that class arbitration
somehow does not constitute "arbitration" appeared to be one reason why five justices
voted to strike a California law regarding class waivers in AT&T. See id. at 1750;
infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text. However, because AT&T only addressed
issues relating to federal preemption of state laws, the waiver issue remains live in
other contexts. See In re Am. Express Merchs' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 194, 199 (2d Cir.
2011) (stating that "Stolt-Nielsen states that parties cannot be forced to engage in a
class arbitration absent a contractual agreement to do so. It does not follow, as Amex
urges, that a contractual clause barring class arbitration is per se enforceable," and
concluding that the waiver was void for public policy).
10. Processes that are not considered "arbitration" cannot take advantage of laws
limiting judicial review, ensuring immunity for neutrals, or permitting easy international enforceability of the resulting award. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penumbra:Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute
Resolution, 8 NEv. L.J. 427, 433-34 (2007); see also SIR MICHAEL J. MUSTILL & STEWART C. BOYD, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 3840 (1989).
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groundwork for further discussion by comparing class arbitration to
other multiparty proceedings. If class arbitration is found to differ
from other types of multiparty arbitration, then it may be possible to
conclude that class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration.""
However, if class arbitration is found to fall within the norms set by
established forms of multiparty arbitration, then class proceedings
cannot be said to affect the nature of arbitration. The analysis in Section II focuses on five possible items of concern: the number of parties
and the amount in dispute, the nature of the parties' claims, the relationship between the parties, the selection of arbitrators, and underlying policy considerations.
Next, Section III considers the jurisprudential nature of arbitration and attempts to identify a universally acceptable definition of
arbitration that can be used in Section IV to determine whether class
arbitration does, in fact, "change[] the nature of arbitration." 1 2 The
discussion in Section IV considers how certain characteristics said to
be unique to class arbitration (including several identified in Section
II) measure up to the elements identified in the definition of arbitration as being necessary for a procedure to qualify as "arbitration."
The analysis in Section IV focuses on four separate issues that are
potentially problematic: excessive formalities, excessive judicial involvement, competence of the arbitral tribunal, and the nature of representative relief. Section V concludes the article by drawing together
the diverse strands of law and policy and offering some final
observations.
Before beginning the analysis, it is useful to set forth a working
definition of class arbitration. Not only will this avoid confusion regarding terms, it will help identify those aspects of class arbitration
that critics find most objectionable.
B. A Working Definition of Class Arbitration
Class arbitration has been characterized as a "'uniquely American' device,"13 and it is certainly true that class arbitration, as currently practiced and envisaged, explicitly imports elements of U.S.style class actions (i.e., large-scale lawsuits seeking representative

11. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1775.
12. Id.
13. The Presidentand Fellows of Harvard College Against JSC Surgutneftegaz,
770 PLI/LIT. 127, 155 (2008) [hereinafter HarvardAward].

HeinOnline -- 17 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 205 2012

206

HarvardNegotiation Law Review

[Vol. 17:201

relief on behalf of dozens to hundreds of thousands of injured parties) 1 4 into the arbitral context. As such, class arbitration reflects a
strong bias toward U.S. conceptions of collective justice.
The device has been in existence since at least the early 1980s,'1
although it was not until 2003, when the United States Supreme
Court gave its implicit approval to the procedure in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 16 that various U.S.-based arbitral institutions promulgated their specialized rules on class arbitration.1 7 The
procedure quickly gained momentum during the first decade of the
century, with more than 300 class arbitrations known to have been
initiated since 2003.18 This is roughly similar to the number of international investment arbitrations filed with the International Centre

14. For a brief overview of U.S. judicial class actions, see Nicholas M. Pace,
Group and Aggregate Litigation in the United States, in 622 THE ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 32, 36-39 (Deborah Hensler et
al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter The Annals].
15. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Interestingly,
there may be U.S. precedent allowing representative relief in arbitration dating back
to 1918-19, when the National War Labor Board effectively acted as an arbitral tribunal whose decisions affected employees beyond those who were named in the suit
before it. See Imre S. Szalai, Aggregate Dispute Resolution: Class and LaborArbitration, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 399, 421-25 (2008).
16. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
17. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS (effective Oct. 8, 2003), available at www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936
[hereinafter AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES]; JAMS THE RESOLUTION EXPERTS, JAMS
2009), available at http://
ACTION PROCEDURES (effective May 1,
CLAsS
www.jamsadr.com/rules-class-action-procedures/ [hereinafter JAMS CLASS ACTION
PROCEDURES]. At one point, the National Arbitration Forum (NAF) had its own set of
class arbitration rules. See NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, ARBITRATION CLASS PROCEDURES, www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/Arbitration%20Class%20Procedures
%202007.pdf [hereinafter NAF ARB. CLASs PROCEDURES]. However, the NAF rules are
now only applicable to arbitrations filed prior to August 2009, which is when the NAF
ceased to administer consumer arbitrations. See Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Credit CardDebt, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/
business/20credit.html.
18. As of January 2012, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) had received filings for over 307 class proceedings. See AAA Searchable Class Arbitration
Docket, www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562. Class arbitrations can also be administered by
other arbitral institutions or proceed ad hoc, although precise numbers cannot be determined due to the confidentiality of such proceedings. However, the existence of
such arbitrations has become known through challenge or enforcement measures in
court. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010);
Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355,
362 n.31 (5th Cir. 2003); JSC Surgutneftegaz v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll.,
No. 04 Civ. 6069 (RMB), 2007 WL 3019234, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007).

HeinOnline -- 17 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 206 2012

Spring 2012]

Return to First Principles

207

for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in the last forty
years.' 9
Although class arbitrations resemble judicial class actions in
some regards, the two devices differ in a few significant ways. For
example, class arbitration incorporates a number of procedures that
are unique to the arbitral realm, such as those regarding the naming
or challenging of arbitrators, the form of an award, etc. 20 Notably,
punitive damages-which are commonly (though mistakenly) believed to be a necessary part of judicial class actionS2 1-are not a required element in class arbitration. 2 2
Class arbitrations can be administered by an arbitral institution
or can proceed on an entirely ad hoc basis. 23 Either type of proceeding may be subject to one of the specialized rule sets on class arbitration (the American Arbitration Association's Supplementary Rules
19. See ICSID Cases, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=ListCases (last visited Jan. 5, 2012) (listing 140 cases as
currently pending and 229 as having concluded); see also ICSID Caseload Statistics,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&action
Val=CaseLoadStatistics (last visited June 30, 2011); UNCTAD, Latest Developments
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA Monitor No. 1 (2009), http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/webdiaeia20096_en.pdf (last visited June 30, 2011).
20.

For a description of procedures in class arbitration, see BERNARD HANOTIAU,

COMPLEx ARBITRATIONS: MULTIPARTY, MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS AcTIONs 257-79 (2005); John Fellas, Feasibilityof Class Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM
PAPERS 2008 183, 184-95 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2009); Eric P. Tuchmann, The Administrationof Class Action Arbitrations, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 325, 325-36 (Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2009). It is
possible that the procedures currently in use will change in the wake of Stolt-Nielsen.
See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758.
21. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland, 27 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 301, 311 (2007); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil
- A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 311, 315 (2003).
22. Although punitive damages can be sought in some class arbitrations, it may
be unwise to seek such relief in anything other than domestic U.S. proceedings since
punitive damages awards are strongly disfavored outside the United States. See generally LEW ET AL., supra note 6, [ 24-75.
23. Although most people associate administered class arbitrations with the
AAA, there is nothing prohibiting the assertion of class claims in arbitrations proceeding under other institutional rules. See Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at
1072-76. Indeed, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) has stated in
intervener papers in the Supreme Court of Canada that it sees class arbitration as
consistent with the goals of arbitration, suggesting that the LCIA will not find class
arbitration problematic under its rules. See Factum of the Intervener, London Court
of International Arbitration, Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 801 8 (Can.), available at www.mcgill.ca/files/arbitration/LCIAFactumDell.pdf; see also S.I. Strong, From Class to Collective: The De-Americanizationof
Class Arbitration, 26 ARS. INT'L 493, 530 (2010) [hereinafter Strong, DeAmericanization].
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for Class Arbitrations (AAA Supplementary Rules) or the JAMS
Class Action Procedures), 24 which can be adopted by the parties either before or after the dispute arises, or imposed as a result of the
parties' having previously agreed to the use of any one of the other
rule sets offered by either the AAA or JAMS, respectively. 2 5 While
other procedures can also be agreed upon by the parties and/or set
forth by the arbitral tribunal, 2 6 the published rule sets provide a useful means of describing and analyzing class arbitration procedure
and reflect what might be considered the standard understanding of
how class arbitration operates today. 27 Notably, the application of
these specialized rule sets does not require a determination that class
arbitration is appropriate in any particular dispute, even though the

See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17; JAMS CLASs ACTION PROCEsupra note 17. The DIS-German Institution for Arbitration has also recently
enacted rules regarding arbitration in shareholder disputes that might be said to create a form of "collective arbitration," which is an arbitral proceeding that uses procedures akin to various forms of collective redress used in the national courts of states
that have not adopted U.S.-style class relief. See DIS-GERMAN INSTITUTION FOR ARBITRATION, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CORPORATE LAW DISPUTES (effective 15 Sept.,
2009), available at www.dis-arb.de/erges/srcold09.html [hereinafter DIS SUPPLEMENTARY RULES]; see also Christian Borris, Arbitrability of Corporate Law Disputes in
Germany, in ONDERNEMING EN ADR 55, 64-65 (C.J.M. Klaassen et al., eds., 2011); S.I.
Strong, Collective Arbitration Under the DIS Supplementary Rules for CorporateLaw
Disputes: A EuropeanForm of Class Arbitration?,29 ASA BULL. 45, 64 (2011) [hereinafter Strong, DIS]. Although the DIS Supplementary Rules will not be discussed in
detail herein, they do provide an interesting comparison to U.S.-style class
procedures.
25. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765 (referencing post-dispute adoption); AAA
SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 1(a); JAMS CLAss ACTION PROCEDURES
supra note 17, rule 1(b).
26. Early in the development of class arbitration, courts were involved in defining appropriate procedures, but this approach appears to have fallen out of practice.
See Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty., 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Carole
J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitral Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral
Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENv. U. L. REv. 301, 301 (2004).
27. See Buckner, supra note 26, at 301 (claiming the hybrid model has been
"swept away"). The AAA Supplementary Rules are particularly influential, perhaps
because they have been at issue in a number of high-profile litigations, including
Stolt-Nielsen. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1765. The AAA is also known to have
administered over 300 class arbitrations since 2003, as demonstrated by the number
of proceedings listed on its online class arbitration docket. See AAA Searchable Class
ArbitrationDocket, supra note 18. The JAMS Class Action Procedures are in many
ways similar to the AAA Supplementary Rules, but are less detailed. Compare AAA
SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, with JAMS CLAss ACTION PROCEDURES, supra
note 17. Unlike the AAA, JAMS does not publish information about class arbitrations
that it administers.
24.

DURES,
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rules include certain criteria and procedures that the arbitral tribunal should follow in determining whether class proceedings are warranted. 28 Instead, both sets of rules explicitly state that the existence
of the specialized rules should not factor into the decision of whether
to proceed as a class. 2 9
Although class arbitration is primarily used in large-scale consumer and employment disputes, 30 the device is not limited to those
fields. Instead, class arbitration mirrors the substantive diversity of
judicial class actions and can involve everything from insurance and
financial disputes to maritime and antitrust claims. 3 ' The one notable difference is that class arbitrations typically do not arise in cases
sounding exclusively in tort, since parties to such disputes seldom
have a pre-existing contractual relationship and thus rarely have an
arbitration agreement in place at the time the injury arises. 32 (Although it is always possible for the parties to agree to arbitration after the dispute has arisen, post-dispute arbitration agreements are
notoriously difficult to obtain, even in cases involving only two
parties.3 3 )
28. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 4; JAMS CLASS ACTION
PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rule 3.
29. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES supra note 17, rule 3; JAMS CLASs ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rule 2.

30. See Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010)
(No. 08-1198), 2009 WL 2896309 at 22-24 (noting 37% of all class arbitrations administered by the AAA involved consumer actions, 37% involved employment actions, 7%
involved franchising, 7% involved healthcare, 3% involved financial services, and 11%
involved other business-to-business concerns).
31. See id.; see also AAA Searchable Class Arbitration Docket, supra note 18;
Buckner, supra note 26, at 301 (discussing areas of law where class actions and class
arbitrations are common); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 401, 407 (2002) (discussing areas where class actions are likely); Strong, DeAmericanization, supra note 23, at 525.
32. See Carolyn B. Lamm & Joceyln A. Aqua, Defining the Party - Who Is a
ProperPartyin an InternationalArbitrationBefore the American ArbitrationAssociation and Other InternationalInstitutions, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 711, 717-18
(2002-03) (discussing situations where the commonality of facts is the sole link between parties, noting it is "impossible" to obtain consent to arbitrate from all parties
in such circumstances). However, recent events in the realm of international investment arbitration have suggested the possible development of a form of mass tort arbitration. See S.I. Strong, Mass Torts and Arbitration: Lessons from Abaclat v.
Argentine Republic, in UNCERTAINTY AND MASS TORT: CAUSATION AND PROOF (forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Strong, Abaclat]. Judicial class actions for mass torts are
common in the United States. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 99-119 (2000).
33. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 1 6-5.
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Issues about who may join a class arbitration can raise questions
about whether these sorts of proceedings really are "class" arbitrations or simply very large consolidated arbitrations. The concern
arises as a result of the perception that judicial class actions are in
some way open to anyone who wishes to join the suit. Class arbitration can be seen as deviating from this open-access aspect of class
actions to the extent that class arbitrations are limited to those who
have a valid arbitration agreement. 3 4 However, judicial class actions
are not in fact open to the world and are instead restricted to those
who have suffered an injury arising out of the same set of laws or
facts. 3 5 Class arbitrations impose precisely the same criteria on the
parties, 36 although claims in class arbitration are limited by the nature of the contract in which the arbitration agreement is found (in
that the legal injury will relate to or arise out of that document). As
such, the arbitral class is restricted to those who are also parties to
the relevant agreements.3 7
34. This requirement is stated explicitly in the AAA Supplementary Rules. See
AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 4. The JAMS Class Action Procedures are silent on this point, although the requirement could be implied as a matter
of common law, supra note 17. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448
(2003) (plurality opinion) (involving functionally identical arbitration agreements).
35. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2) (allowing class suits only when there are, among
other things, "questions of law or fact common to the class").
36. The language in the AAA Supplementary Rules regarding the prerequisites
for a class proceeding is identical to that found in Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, except that the AAA Supplementary Rules include an extra provision indicating the need for substantially similar arbitration agreements among the members
of the class. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 4.
The JAMS Class Action Procedures explicitly incorporate Rule 23 by reference and do
not include an explicit requirement that all parties be signatories to substantially
similar arbitration agreements. See JAMS CLASs AcTIoN PROCEDURES, supra note 17,

rule 3. The similarities between the class arbitration rules and the Federal Rules are
intentional, in that the drafters of the arbitral rules wanted to provide courts and
arbitrators with the opportunity of relying on existing precedents and principles involving Rule 23 when construing the arbitral rules. See Meredith W. Nissen, Class
Action Arbitrations:AAA vs. JAMS: Different Approaches to a New Concept, 11 DisP.
RESOL. MAG. 19 (2005); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation
Critique,49 Aiz. L. REV. 69, 94-95 (2007).
37. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 4(a)(2). It is conceivable
that a class claim in arbitration could be initially made on behalf of both signatories
and non-signatories, as in a product liability claim where some injured parties had
purchased the defective items from the manufacturer (and thus were signatories of an
arbitration agreement included in the contract of sale) while other injured parties
were simply users of the defective items or innocent bystanders. However, existing
principles of arbitration law would not only permit but would likely require the nonsignatory claims to be severed from the signatory claims. See Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Co., 460 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1983); LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 15:6, at 15-29 to 15-30 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter DoMKE]; LEw ET AL., supra
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DISTINGUISHING CLASS ARBITRATION FROM OTHER
MULTIPARTY PROCEEDINGS

Having provided a brief working understanding of class arbitration, the next analytical step involves distinguishing class arbitration
from more established forms of multiparty arbitration. If class arbitration does not deviate from these procedures in any significant way,
then the claim that class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration"3 8 would appear insupportable.
As it turns out, the arbitral community is well versed in multiparty proceedings, having had decades of experience with consolidation, joinder, and intervention, as well as disputes initiated on a
multilateral basis. Once relatively rare, these types of "traditional"3 9
multiparty arbitrations have been seen with increasing frequency in
recent years and now constitute a significant proportion of the
caseload of certain arbitral institutions. 40
At one time, courts and commentators looked on multiparty proceedings with a great deal of skepticism, but this longstanding hostility has apparently waned. 4 1 This shift in attitude may be due to the
adoption of increasingly strong pro-arbitration policies in many
states, but it may also be the result of fundamental changes in commercial practice that have led to a rising need for such proceedings. 4 2
The depth and diversity of the discussion about traditional multiparty arbitration provides a strong basis for comparison with class
note 6, $ 16-39 to 16-40. Notably, requiring a class of non-signatories to proceed in
court would not affect the class (i.e., representative) characteristics of the claims remaining in arbitration, nor would it do violence to the concept of class suits, since
class actions have long recognized the use of subclasses. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(5).
38. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
39. For purposes of this article, the term "traditional multiparty arbitration" will
include non-class proceedings that are initially filed as multiparty arbitrations as well
as those that achieve multiparty status later through consolidation, joinder, or
intervention.
40. From 1995 to 2001, the percentage of multiparty arbitrations administered
by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) rose from 20% to 30%. See LEW ET
AL., supra note 6, [ 16-1. Furthermore, more than 50% of LCIA arbitrations reportedly involve more than two parties. See Martin Platte, When Should an Arbitrator
Join Cases?, 18 ARB. INT'L 67, 67 (2002).
41. Debate still arises about the propriety of multiparty arbitration in traditional
contexts, but the focus is on whether multiparty arbitration is permissible in various
individual circumstances, not whether the device is permissible as an abstract concept. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2065-2104. See generally LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 91
16-1 to 16-99.
42. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6, IT 16-1 to 16-3.
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arbitration. 4 3 Five areas of analysis require consideration: the number of parties and the amount in dispute, the nature of the parties'
claims, the relationship between the parties, the selection of arbitrators, and underlying policy considerations. Each is discussed separately below.
A.

Number of Parties and Amount in Dispute

The first difference between class arbitration and traditional
forms of multiparty arbitration relates to the number of participants
and the amount in dispute. Experience suggests that most non-class
multiparty arbitrations are relatively small, involving only three to
five parties. Class arbitration, on the other hand, typically determines the rights of anywhere between a dozen to hundreds of
thousands of parties in a single proceeding. 4 4
Although the sheer magnitude of the dispute is one hallmark of
class arbitration, there is, at this point, no requirement that a certain
minimum number of parties be involved. Instead, published rules on
class arbitration adopt an approach similar to that used in U.S. judicial class actions and inquire simply whether the number of parties is
"so numerous that joinder of separate arbitrations on behalf of all
members is impracticable." 4 5 In cases where no such rules apply,
tribunals will likely look to the law of the seat and/or the governing
substantive or procedural law to decide whether there is a sufficient
number of parties to constitute a class. 46
43. This is not to say that class arbitration is entirely analogous to such proceedings. For years, class arbitration was considered to be analytically similar to consolidated arbitration, an approach that created some jurisprudential difficulties. See
Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 1038-43.
44. See Opinion and Order regarding Class Certification, Bagpeddler.com v. U.S.
BanCorp., No. 11 181 0032204 (Am. Arb. Ass'n, May 4, 2007), www.adr.org/
si.asp?id=4667 (seeking to certify a class of 400,000 internet merchants); Class Determination Partial Final Award, Partners Two, Inc. v. Adecco North Am., LLC, No. 11
114 03042 40 (Am. Arb. Ass'n, Dec. 2004), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3821 (seeking
to certify a class of twenty-nine franchisees).
45. AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 4(a)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(a); JAMS CLASs ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rule 3(a).
46. See Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 23, at 514. As class arbitration
moves beyond U.S. borders, some variations regarding the minimum number of participants could arise since different states use different standards regarding the number of parties who must be present to justify class treatment in national courts. Some
of these jurisdictions use a numerosity requirement similar to that used in the United
States, whereas others prescribe a certain minimum number of class members. See
generally RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASs ACTION IN COMMON LAw LEGAL SYSTEMS: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 6-8 (2004) (discussing Australian class actions); Gidi,
supra note 21, at 367 n.167 (noting no numerosity requirement in Brazilian judicial
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Although traditional multiparty arbitrations are typically much
smaller than class arbitrations, there are exceptions. For example,
one well-known ICC arbitration from the late 1990s involved more
than 140 parties, with more than $14 billion in dispute.4 7 Examples
of other large-scale non-class arbitrations exist, both in terms of the
number of parties and the amount in dispute.4 8 Indeed, Justice
Breyer noted numerous instances of high-stakes arbitration in his
opinion in AT&T.4 9 No one has claimed that these disputes constitute
something other than "arbitration," based merely on the number of
parties involved or the amounts in dispute. Therefore, while the magnitude of a proceeding may constitute a hallmark of class arbitration,
it is not a defining factor. Furthermore, the mere fact that a proceeding resolves a large number of individual claims or a large amount in
dispute cannot be said to "change [] the nature" of the proceeding
from arbitration to something else, since large-scale claims have been
resolved in arbitration before.5 0
B.

Nature of the Parties' Claims

The second difference between class arbitration and other forms
of multiparty arbitration involves the nature of the claims that are
being asserted. Unlike traditional multiparty arbitration, which involves claims brought by individuals on their own behalf, class arbitration involves parties who seek relief on a representative basis. 5 1 In
other words, several named individuals not only bring their own
claims but also assert the claims of other parties who are unnamed at
group actions); Sherman, supra note 31, at 424-30 (discussing Australian and Canadian class actions).
47. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6,
16-57 to 16-58; Barry R. Ostrager et al.,
Andersen v. Andersen: The Claimants' Perspective, 10 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 443, 443
(1999).
48. See ArbitrationScorecard 2007: Top 50 Treaty Disputes, AM. LAw. (June 13,
2007), http://www.law.comjsp/article.jsp?id=900005555705&s1return=1 (noting fifty
multimillion and multibillion dollar arbitrations); Tim Webb, Yukos Shareholders
Win First Round in Legal Battle, GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2009), www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/nov/30/yukos-shareholders-russian-government-oil (noting $100 billion at
stake in a Russian shareholder arbitration).
49. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1760 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Although the majority questioned whether arbitral awards of this size
were "predictable when the arbitration agreement was entered," id. at 1752 n.8, there
has never been a requirement in arbitration that the parties must be able to anticipate the quantum of damages that might arise. Instead, the inquiry has always focused simply on whether the type of claim made falls within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.
50. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
51. It is possible to have a respondent class instead of, or in addition to, a claimant class, but this seldom occurs even in the context of judicial class actions. Notably,

HeinOnline -- 17 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 213 2012

214

Harvard Negotiation Law Review

[Vol. 17:201

the time of filing. 5 2 While these unnamed parties have some choice as
to whether to have their rights asserted in the proceeding and personally receive the benefit of any individual damages that may be
won on their behalf should they join the proceeding, unnamed parties
typically do not exert a great deal of independent control over the
conduct of the case.5 3 Although concerns have been raised about possible infringements of the procedural rights of unnamed parties in
both judicial and arbitral contexts, 5 4 class proceedings are also considered to be a legitimate means of furthering certain regulatory and
policy goals.5 5
AT&T illustrates the tension between these two viewpoints. For
example, although Justice Scalia found it "odd to think that an arbitrator would be entrusted with ensuring that third parties' due process rights are satisfied,"5 6 Justice Breyer noted that "class
arbitration is consistent with the use of arbitration. It is a form of
arbitration that is well known in California and followed elsewhere."5 7 Indeed, class arbitration has been in existence for thirty
years and has been reviewed several times by the U.S. Supreme
Court.5 8 Never once has the Supreme Court questioned or curtailed
the use of representative relief in arbitration, thereby implicitly approving the device and making it too late to revisit the propriety of

the presence of several named respondents does not reflect the existence of a respondent class so long as those respondents are individually named in their own capacity.
See id. (involving seven named respondents).
52. Eventually the identity of unnamed parties will be made known. See infra
notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
53. Unnamed parties are explicitly given the right to participate in class arbitrations proceeding under the AAA Supplementary Rules, even if some or indeed most
parties do not exercise that right. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17,
rule 9(a). The JAMS Class Action Procedures include no such provision. See JAMS
CLASs AcTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17.
54. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 32, at 445-66; Jean R. Sternlight, As
Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1, 32, 52-53 (2000); Maureen A. Weston, Universes
Colliding: The ConstitutionalImplications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1711, 1721-22, 1741-44, 1768-78 (2006).
55. See infra notes 118, 171-79 and accompanying text.
56. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).
57. Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 1751-52 (questioning use of representative relief but not restricting
it); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758 (2010); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S.
444 (2003); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Szalai, supra note
15, at 421-25.
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resolving the rights of unnamed members of a class in arbitration as
a general matter.5 9
Nevertheless, the provision of representative relief in the arbitral context can create at least two problems. First, some nations do
not permit parties to seek representative relief, even in court, on the
grounds that anything other than individualized relief violates the
fundamental rights of either the defendant or the represented party
(or possibly both). 60 States that take this view are not only unlikely to
adopt class arbitration themselves (although they may develop their
own forms of collective arbitration),6 1 they may also attempt to invoke domestic public policy to refuse enforcement of class awards rendered in other states or under other states' laws. 6 2
This particular problem is somewhat speculative at the moment,
since most class arbitrations are currently seated in the United
States, a jurisdiction that expressly permits parties to seek representative relief in court.6 3 However, there is a second problem that applies to U.S.-based arbitrations as well as class proceedings seated
59. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
633 (1985) (noting that courts that agree to allow certain complex claims to go to
arbitration pursuant to the parties' express agreement cannot later claim that those
matters are "inherently insusceptible to resolution by arbitration").
60. See Baumgartner, supra note 21, at 310-11; Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio
Consolo, Class Actions for Continental Europe?A PreliminaryInquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L
& COMP. L.J. 217, 233 (1992); Gidi, supra note 21, at 385-86.
61. See Borris, supra note 24; Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 23, at
498-508; Strong, DIS, supra note 24, at 64-65; see also DIS SUPPLEMENTARY RULES,
supra note 24 (involving collective arbitration).
62. This would be improper for a variety of reasons. See S.I. Strong, Enforcing
Class Arbitration in the International Sphere: Due Process and Public Policy Concerns, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1, 89-93 (2008) [hereinafter Strong, Due Process].
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Although most, if not all, class arbitrations so far have
been seated in the United States, class and collective arbitration have been legislatively and judicially considered in several other jurisdictions, including Canada, Colombia, Germany, and Luxembourg. See MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT
115, MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES AND CONSUMER CLASS PROCEEDINGS (April
2008), at 3-4, 22-23; Valencia v. Bancolombia (Colombia v. Colombia), Zuleta Digest
for Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) (Arb. Trib. Bogoti Chamber Comm.
2003), availableon www.luwerarbitration.com; Stephanie Bodoni, UBS, Custodians
Have Duty to Pay Madoff Investors, Frieden Says, BLOOMBERG (June 5, 2009), www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a8KUxWlcXdvU; Borris, supra note
24, at 57-64; Jeffrey S. Leon et al., Class Arbitrations in Canada:the Business Case,
(2010) CAN. CLASS ACTION REV. 381 (discussing Canadian developments); Ian Meredith & Sean Kelsey, Treasury and Budget Minister of Luxembourg Calls for Arbitration of Madoff Claims, K&L GATES, http://www.globalfinancialmarketwatch.com/
2009/06/articles/treasury-and-budget-minister-of-luxembourg-calls-for-arbitration-ofmadoff-claims/; S.I. Strong, Resolving Mass Legal Disputes Through Class Arbitration: The United States and CanadaCompared, 37 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & Comm. REG. _
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elsewhere.6 4 The issue here involves certain procedures that have
been imposed to help protect the rights of unnamed parties in class
arbitration.6 5 These measures either permit or require an increased
degree of judicial involvement in arbitral proceedings.
Two different approaches exist. The first-termed the "hybrid
model"-allows courts to retain responsibility for certain decisions
(such as certification of and notice to the class as well as fairness
approvals of the final arbitral award),6 6 while the arbitrators take
jurisdiction over the evaluation of the merits of the case. This approach, which developed as a common law, judge-made device, came
about as a means of avoiding any violation of the parties' procedural
rights that might arise as a result of arbitrators' inexperience with
(forthcoming 2012). Furthermore, at least one mass arbitration is currently proceeding in the international investment realm. See Beccara v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/07/5, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Apr. 27, 2007); Abaclat (formerly Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (Apr. 7, 2007), available at
icsid.worldbank.org; see also MARIEL DIMsEY, THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 203-18 (2008) (describing a second
possible group investment arbitration); Veijo Heiskanen, Arbitrating Mass Investor
Claims:Lessons of InternationalClaims Commissions, in MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, supra note 20, at 297-98, 308-23. The Abaclat case has
yielded a very interesting preliminary award and dissenting opinion on jurisdiction.
See Abaclat and Others (formerly Beccara and Others) v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. Arb/07/5, INVEST. ARB. REP. (Aug. 10, 2011),
www.iareporter.com/downloads/20110810 (discussing nature of mass investment arbitration involving 60,000 Italian bondholders); Abaclat and Others (formerly Beccara
and Others) v. Argentine Republic, Dissenting Opinion on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case
No. Arb/07/5 (Oct. 28, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDissentingOpinion.pdf (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010),
and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010)); Strong, Abaclat,
supra note 32; S.I. Strong, Collective Arbitration in ICSID Disputes:Abaclat (formerly
Beccara) v. Argentine Republic, 17 ARB. NEWS _ (Mar. 2012).
64. A growing number of commentators take the view that the device will eventually expand beyond U.S. borders. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 1231-32; J. Brian Casey,
Commentary: Class Action ArbitrationShould be Available, LAw. WKLY. (Can.), Mar.
31, 2006, at 9; Leon et al., supra note 63; Gabrielle Nater-Bass, Class Action Arbitration: A New Challenge?, 27 ASA BULL. 671, 687 (2009); S.I. Strong, Class Arbitration
Outside the United States: Reading the Tea Leaves, in DOSSIER VII: ARBITRATION AND
MULTIPARTY CONTRACTS 183, 183-84 (Bernard Hanotiau & Eric A. Schwartz eds.,
2010); Strong, De-Americanization,supra note 23, at 494-95.
65. Some also see these procedural protections as reflecting the concept of inferred consent to dispensation of the unnamed parties' claims through litigation or
settlement. See Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1157-58 (2010). This interpretation of the nature of the procedural protections may be useful as a means of establishing consent to the procedures
in class arbitration.
66. These fairness reviews are similar to those used by courts in class actions
proceeding under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23; Buckner, supra note 26, at 320-23.
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class proceedings.6 7 Although this model was typically used during
the early days of class arbitration, it is unclear whether hybrid procedures are still in use,6 8 a factor that may be important in determining
whether class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration."9
The second method of protecting the rights of unnamed parties is
still very much in use and was explicitly discussed by both the majority and the dissent in Stolt-Nielsen.70 Rather than arising out of the
common law, this approach developed as a result of the publication of
special rules on class arbitration.7 1 This model allows the arbitral tribunal to retain jurisdiction over all aspects of the arbitration, including certification of and notice to the class as well as control over
fairness approvals of the final arbitral award. 7 2 Courts are not given
any mandatory duties under these rules, nor are they allowed to insert themselves sua sponte into the process. However, increased judicial oversight is expressly contemplated in rule-based class
arbitration by virtue of certain partial final awards that must be rendered by the arbitrators at two predetermined times. These awards,
which involve (1) the construction of the arbitration agreement and
(2) the determination of whether class treatment is warranted as a
factual matter, may be taken by one or more parties to court for immediate review.73 Although partial final awards have been used in
67. See Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 785 (Ct. App.
1998); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 876 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991); Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360-61 (S.C. 2002), vacated,
539 U.S. 444 (2003); Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L.
REV. 185, 226-39 (2006).
68. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765
(2010) (discussing only procedures under AAA Supplementary Rules); see also Buckner, supra note 26, at 301 (claiming the hybrid model has been "swept away").
69. Stolt-Nielsea, 130 S. Ct. at 1775; see infra notes 297-300 and accompanying
text.
70. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1776; id. at 1778 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17; JAMS CLASs ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17; NAF AuB. CLASS PROCEDURES, supra note 17; supra notes 16-17
and accompanying text.
72. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rules 4, 6, 8; JAMS CLASS
ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rules 3-4, 6. In rule-based class arbitrations, the
tribunal acts as a check on party autonomy by independently reviewing the scope of
the class, notice to the class, and settlement agreements for reasonableness. In judicial class actions, the court undertakes this type of heightened review. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23. The intent in either case is to avoid collusion between respondents and
named parties in creating or settling a class for improper purposes and injuring the
interests of the unnamed parties. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 32, at 79-99.
73. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rules 3, 5; JAMS CLASs AcTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rules 2-3.
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other contexts in both bilateral and traditional multiparty proceedings, 7 4 no other form of arbitration requires arbitral tribunals to
render partial final awards on such a systematic basis.
Interestingly, the rationale underlying the use of partial final
awards is not precisely the same as the rationale for shared jurisdiction under the hybrid model. The hybrid approach reflects a concern
about arbitrator competence in light of an assumption that arbitrators have little experience with class proceedings. 7 5 The rule-based
model allows immediate judicial review of certain preliminary decisions that go to the heart of whether class proceedings are warranted
in order to protect parties from the effect of an ill-advised decision
regarding class treatment. This procedure, which mimics the interlocutory appeal process used in judicial class actions, 76 provides benefits across the board, in that claimants are not forced to abandon
their claims precipitously if class treatment is not ordered while respondents are not pressured to settle frivolous claims if class treatment is ordered.7 7 Thus, the rule-based approach to class arbitration
reflects the view that arbitrators and judges are equally competent to
decide matters regarding class procedure, while also acknowledging
that errant decisions are possible in individual cases, which creates
the need to make immediate review available. Unfortunately, transplanting judicial review procedures from class actions directly into
the arbitral realm has led to certain problems.7 8
Thus, the nature of the parties' claims gives rise to two types of
concern. First, class arbitration differs from traditional multiparty
74. Use of such awards is generally discouraged. See BORN, supra note 5, at
2815-26; EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1999) IT 1359-62 [hereinafter FoUCHARD,
GAILLARD, GOLDMAN]; LEW ET AL., supra note 6,
24-14 to 24-23.
75. The AAA explicitly addressed these concerns by creating a national panel of
class arbitration experts that must be used in any class proceeding. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 2 (requiring at least one panelist to come from
the class arbitrator roster).

76. The specialized rules on class arbitration involve two opportunities for judicial review rather than one, since judicial class actions do not need to construe the
terms of an arbitration agreement. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f); AAA SUPPLEMENTARY
RULES, supra note 17, rules 3, 5; JAMS CLAss ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17,
rules 2-3.
77. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text. Business interests have long
taken the view that class suits are routinely brought for frivolous reasons simply to
achieve a windfall through settlement, although empirical evidence does not support
that conclusion. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 85 (2008).
78.

In particular, questions are raised with respect to the scope and standard of

review. See infra notes 225-45 and accompanying text.
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arbitration with respect to the character of the relief requested. Class
arbitrations involve representative, rather than individual, claims,
and it is this attribute, rather than the size of the dispute or the
amount in contention, that distinguishes class arbitrations from very
large multiparty proceedings. 79
Secondly, the arbitral and judicial communities have required or
permitted the use of certain special procedures in response to the assertion of representative rights. One method of protection for unnamed parties-the hybrid model-requires significant judicial
intervention, although it is unclear whether this approach is still in
use. The second method of protection-the rule-based model-only
permits judicial involvement when one or both parties seek review of
certain partial final awards rendered under the rules.
Since these are both ways in which class arbitration differs from
traditional forms of multiparty arbitration, these issues require
closer analysis to see if they "change[I the nature of arbitration"8 0 in
some manner. That analysis will be conducted below. 8 1
C.

Relationship Between the Parties

The third potential difference between class and traditional multiparty arbitration relates to the relationship between the parties.
The analysis here is somewhat involved, although it can be simplified
by separating out the issue of non-signatories, meaning parties who
have not signed an arbitration agreement with any of the other participants, from issues regarding the propriety of multiparty or class
proceedings. 8 2 Questions involving non-signatories arise in multiparty proceedings with some frequency and are usually resolved
through recourse to concepts such as consent, agency, assumption,
alter ego, piercing the corporate veil, estoppel, incorporation by reference, and the group of companies doctrine.8 3 Confusion can arise because some of these principles can also be invoked when determining
79. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
80. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
81. See infra notes 224-45, 290-313 and accompanying text.
82. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2086 (distinguishing non-signatory issue from
multiparty issue); NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 1 2.39 (2009) (framing the issue as "third parties to the arbitration
agreement") [hereinafter REDFERN AND HUNTER].

83. See Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir.
1995) (outlining means of obtaining arbitral jurisdiction over non-signatories in a
U.S. proceeding); BORN, supra note 5, at 1142-1205.
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whether multiparty proceedings are proper. 84 However, there is no
need to consider "pure" non-signatory issues in this discussion because all of the parties in Stolt-Nielsen signed an arbitration agreement with at least one other party to the dispute, a situation that will
be true of most, if not all, class arbitrations. 85
Once the matter of non-signatories has been set aside, the issue
becomes whether multilateral arbitration is warranted in the circumstances at bar.8 6 The analysis here is facilitated by differentiating
between two types of contractual relationship. The first type of relationship involves multiple parties to a single contract. The paradigmatic example in the context of traditional multiparty proceedings is
a consortium or joint venture agreement that provides for arbitration
and that includes several different signatories. 7 Although the existence of a single arbitration agreement with multiple signatories does
not require multiparty proceedings, this type of relationship canabsent contractual language or relevant law that forbids multiparty
treatment-suggest that the parties intended or at least anticipated
the possibility of multiparty arbitration.8 8
Single-contract relationships can also give rise to class arbitration. In this case, the paradigmatic example involves a corporation
whose bylaws or articles of incorporation require arbitration of any
disputes relating to those bylaws or articles of incorporation.8 9 Again,
the fact that all of the parties are bound by the same document can
suggest that a dispute arising out of, or related to, that agreement
could or should involve all signatories.9 0
84. For example, the group of companies theory could be used to inquire whether
a series of related entities-all of whom have signed arbitration agreements with at
least one other party-should be required to proceed in a single arbitration. Although
this could be seen as a non-signatory issue to the extent that not all of the parties
have signed the same agreement, it has also been considered a question of intent with
respect to the type of proceedings to be adopted. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2084-86.
85. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764-65; see also supra note 37. However, to
the extent that non-signatory issues arise, they can be handled through existing principles of law without altering the class analysis in any way. See supra note 83.
86.

See HANOTIAU, supra note 20, at 4-5, 103; see also BORN, supra note 5, at

2086.
87. See REDFERN AND HUNTER, supra note 82, 9[ 2.188; Platte, supra note 40,
nn.23-33.
88.

See BORN, supra note 5, at 2085 n.83; REDFERN AND HUNTER, supra note 82,

3-73; Fritz Nicklisch, Multi-PartyArbitrationand Dispute Resolution in Major Industrial Projects, 11 J. INT'L Ana. 57, 59-60, 71 (2004); Platte, supra note 40, nn.18-22.
89. See Valencia v. Bancolombia (Colombia v. Colombia), Zuleta Digest for Institute for Transnational Arbitration (ITA) (Arb. Trib. Bogota Chamber Comm. 2003),
availableon www.kluwerarbitration.com; see also Borris, supra note 24; Strong, DIS,
supra note 24, at 50.
90. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 2084; LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 1 16-8.

HeinOnline -- 17 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 220 2012

Spring 2012]

Return to FirstPrinciples

221

Analyses regarding the propriety of multiparty arbitration in the
case of single-contract relationships are relatively straightforward,
regardless of whether the dispute involves class or traditional multiparty claims. 9 ' Because there is nothing to distinguish the two
types of proceedings, class arbitrations arising out of a single contract
therefore cannot be said to affect the nature of arbitration, at least
with respect to this issue.
The second type of contractual relationship to consider is slightly
more complicated, in that it not only involves multiple parties but
also multiple contracts. 9 2 In these situations, all of the parties to the
purported arbitration have signed arbitration agreements with at
least one other party, but the agreements are found in different documents. Because the arbitration agreements are all bilateral on their
face, it is more difficult to conclude that the parties have agreed to
have their disputes heard in anything other than a bilateral
proceeding.
This is not to say that these relationships cannot result in multiparty arbitration. To the contrary, courts and arbitrators have
found that multiparty arbitration-either traditional or class-may
be ordered, even in multi-contract situations, so long as the parties
have demonstrated the requisite type of consent.93 To find such consent, courts and arbitrators look first to the terms of the parties'
agreement. 94 However, that document is often silent or ambiguous
with respect to class or multiparty treatment.9 5 In those cases, the
analysis focuses on a variety of factors, which may include the type of
relationship between the parties.9 6 For example, the context in which
91. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2084; LEW ET AL., supra note 6,
16-8; see also
Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 1059-83; infra note 96.
92. See REDFERN AND HUNTER, supra note 82, 2.191.
93. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2085 n.83. The amount and type of consent necessary to result in class arbitration is an interesting question that is possibly in a state
of flux. Compare Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality
opinion) (stating "the relevant question here is what kind of arbitrationproceeding
the parties agreed to"), with Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct.
1758, 1776 (2010) (claiming "we see the question as being whether the parties agreed
to authorize class arbitration"); see also infra notes 255-69 and accompanying text.
94. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773-74.
95. Sometimes that is an intentional choice, whereas other times it is simply an
omission. See HANOTIAU, supra note 20, at 104-05.
96. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2084; LEW ET AL., supra note 6,
16-8. When
arbitration agreements are silent or ambiguous as to the issue of multiparty proceedings, arbitrators often rely on three general interpretive rules that
are the same as the general principles frequently adopted with respect to all
contracts. They include the principle of interpretation in good faith (A), the
principle of effective interpretation (B) and the principle of interpretation
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the multiple bilateral contracts were drafted may demonstrate that
the parties knew of the existence of a larger contractual scheme and
intended that any disputes between the parties were to be resolved
on a multilateral basis, involving all or many of the signatories to the
individual contracts.9 7 Alternatively, it may be that a number of the
potential parties operated as a single group of companies, thus justifying resolution of disputes in a single proceeding.9 8 A more novel
argument would consider whether the parties might have expected a
multiparty proceeding because that would be the only way to effectuate certain statutory rights or protect the parties' right to access to
justice. 99 Interestingly, the majority in Stolt-Nielsen seemed to accept
(at least in part) the argument that because the charter party in
question had never been the subject of a judicial class action, the parties could not have anticipated a class arbitration.1 0 0 If this is a relevant consideration, then the opposite would be equally true-that a
class arbitration could be expected in a situation where a class action
would have arisen had no arbitration agreement been in place.
One way to analyze multiparty issues would be by reference to
these sorts of factual considerations. However, it is also possible to
evaluate these relationships in a more formalistic manner, relying on
concepts of contractual privity. 0 1 As the following shows, the privity
approach yields important information about possible distinctions between class and multiparty arbitrations.
Multi-contract, multiparty relationships appear to fall into two
basic types. The first involves a series of contracts that can be visualized as a vertical string. The paradigmatic example of this type of
contra proferentem (C). However, the principles of strict interpretation (D)
and of interpretation in favorem validitatis (E) should not . . . apply.
476 (citation omitted); see also
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 74,
Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 1055-83. The technique is similar to that
used in cases involving pathological clauses, which raise issues of intent that are similar to those found in multiparty scenarios. See Benjamin G. Davis, Pathological
Clauses: Friddric Eisemann's Still Vital Criteria, 7 ARB. INr'L 365, 365-66 (1991);
Klaus Peter Berger, Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make
Sense, 17 ARB. INT'L 1, 11-12 (2001).
97. See Platte, supra note 40, nn.37-38.
98. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 1168-78.
99. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011)
(noting a class waiver precluding plaintiffs from vindicating statutory rights rendered
an arbitration provision unenforceable, even after Stolt-Nielsen).
100. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1769
(2010).
101. See Platte, supra note 40, nn.18-22.
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relationship would be a construction dispute involving a series of bilateral contracts with the client at the top level, the general contractor at the second level, and the various subcontractors at the third
level. 10 2 All of these agreements are bilateral, although one partythe general contractor-stands in contractual privity with each of the
other parties. The general contractor therefore acts as the intermediary between the injured party (the client) at the top of the string and
other potential parties (the subcontractors) at the bottom of the
string.103 As such, the general contractor is the party most likely to
seek multiparty proceedings, since the general contractor will often
want to bring in one or more of the subcontractors as co- or crossrespondents. Seldom will the client want to add the subcontractors as
parties, since it is easier and less expensive to proceed solely against
the general contractor.
Not all multiparty, multi-contract relationships can be visualized
in string format, however. A second type of scenario exists, reflecting
more of a hub-and-spoke arrangement, with a single party standing
at the center of the wheel, typically as both the offending party (i.e.,
the respondent) and the only participant with a contract with each of
the individual claimants. Although these types of relationships can
arise in traditional multiparty arbitrations, 1 0 4 the hub-and-spoke
model is far more typical of class arbitration.1 0 5 For example, a manufacturer could be seen to stand in the middle of various consumer
claimants in a consumer class arbitration. Alternatively, an employer
could be viewed as acting as the center of a class suit brought by a
group of employees.
Interestingly, the two types of multiparty, multi-contract relationships give rise to very different concerns. The analysis can be broken into two separate issues, one involving the form of the various
arbitration agreements and the other relating to the type of claims
made. Each is addressed in turn.
102. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6, [T 16-34 to 16-38.
103. This assumes that the claim moves down the chain. It is also possible for
claims to move upward, as in a dispute seeking payment for services rendered.
104. For example, a hub-and-spoke relationship would arise in disputes involving
an umbrella organization (such as a socidtd coopgrative) and its constituent members.
See Ostrager et al., supra note 47, at 443 (discussing arbitration involving 140 parties, all of whom had bilateral arbitration agreements with the Swiss socidtd coopdrative that acted as the umbrella organization).
105. A class claim could conceivably involve a string relationship (for example, in a
dispute involving a class of insured parties, a cedent and a reinsurer), although these
relationships resemble a multi-respondent hub-and-spoke model more than a vertical
string.
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i. Form of the arbitrationagreement
When considering the propriety of multiparty or class arbitration
in cases of contractual silence or ambiguity, the form of the agree-

ment between the parties is often highly relevant, with courts and
arbitrators being more likely to order multiparty proceedings when
the arbitration agreements in question are identical or nearly identical in form. 10 6 To some extent, this result may be because, as a jurisprudential matter, using the same or similar arbitration agreements
suggests that the parties contemplated the likelihood of a single proceeding, even though the individual arbitration agreements are found
in a series of bilateral contracts.1 0 7 However, it may also be true that,
as a practical matter, using the same or similar arbitration agreements eliminates many of the interpretive problems associated with
construing conflicting arbitral provisions.10 8
Applying this principle to the two types of multiparty, multi-contract relationships described above yields interesting results. For example, string relationships frequently involve very different
arbitration provisions, since the individual contracts in which the arbitration agreements are found are usually negotiated separately.109
Although there are ways to address the practical problems associated
with construing conflicting arbitral provisions,11 o difficulties remain
at the jurisprudential level. For instance, differences in language can
offset the suggestion that claims should be handled jointly because
the transaction as a whole was structured at one time and with one
purpose in mind."' 1 The more disparate the various provisions, the
less likely multiparty proceedings are to be ordered. 1 12 Thus, string
contracts can experience significant practical and jurisprudential difficulties with respect to the form of the relevant arbitration
agreements.
Hub-and-spoke relationships exhibit very different characteristics with regard to the form of the various arbitration agreements.
106. See Platte, supra note 40, nn.37-39. The AAA Supplementary Rules require
the existence of arbitration agreements that are the same or substantially similar, a
requirement that may also exist as a matter of common law. See Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448 (2003) (plurality opinion) (involving functionally
identical arbitration agreements); AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 4.
107. See HANOTIAU, supra note 20, at 109-14, 161.
108. See id. at 109-20, 161.
109. See id. at 104-05.
110. See supra note 96.
111. See HANOTIAU, supra note 20, at 108-18.
112. See Platte,supra note 40, nn.34-50 (discussing differences regarding arbitral
institutions, arbitral rules, arbitral seat, or governing law).
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Disputes in these contexts almost always involve a series of identical
(or functionally identical) 1 3 arbitration provisions, often embodied in
a series of standard contracts that are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis and that cannot be individually negotiated.11 4 Therefore, few, if
any, practical issues arise with respect to the construction of differing
arbitration provisions.115
The jurisprudential analysis is not quite so simple, however.
Here, the difficulty is whether the intent to arbitrate disputes on a
multilateral basis can be found, given that the parties who represent
the spokes of the wheel typically do not know each other personally.
Although each dispute will turn on its own facts, an element of collectivity can nevertheless be identified in many instances. For example,
the members of a socidtd coopdrative typically know that other, similarly situated parties exist as part of the larger commercial relationship and would likely consider it logical to resolve identical or related
disputes in a single proceeding.-"- Similarly, in the context of class
arbitration, the nature of the respondent's business dealings can lead
members of a class to surmise that other, similarly situated parties
exist, even if the various individuals do not know each other by
name.1 17 The notion of collectivity in the class context may be
strengthened in jurisdictions that traditionally permit or require certain claims to be brought as judicial class actions, since even laypersons will understand that their individual claims could be joined with
those of other parties, in appropriate circumstances."18
113. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448 (2003) (plurality
opinion).
114. All of the United States Supreme Court decisions on class arbitration have
dealt with hub-and-spoke arrangements. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131
S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758
(2010); Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 444; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
115. But see Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 456-57 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (claiming a minor difference in language had to be given weight). Some people have suggested that
corporations can avoid the possibility of class arbitration simply by amending their
arbitration agreements slightly from time to time. See Philip Allen Lacovara, Class
Action Arbitrations- the Challenge for the Business Community, 24 ARB. INT'L 541,
559 (2008); Kathleen M. Scanlon, Class Arbitration Waivers: The "Severability"Doctrine and its Consequences, Disp. RESOL. J. 44 (Feb.-Apr. 2007).
116. See The Decision, Judgment of the Swiss Federal Court, 10 Am. REV. INT'L
ARB. 559, 564-68 (1999) (discussing construction of arbitration agreements in Andersen arbitration); supra note 47 and accompanying text.
117. For example, parties to a consumer class arbitration know that the respondent is in the business of dealing with consumers. Similarly, parties to an employment class arbitration know that the respondent has other employees.
118. See In re Am. Express Merchs' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011) (considering congressional intent in enacting antitrust laws and interplay with class waivers); supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text. Although the United States is the
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Corporate respondents are also aware of the collective nature of
many of these kinds of claims. Indeed, that is precisely why many of
these respondents turned to arbitration in the first place: to avoid the
possibility of judicial class actions." 9 This creates an interesting dilemma as to whether the respondent's subjective intent to use arbitration to eliminate class proceedings can or should be given effect.
The question implicates the concept of party autonomy, which is
universally agreed to be a fundamental principle of arbitration. 120
Certainly, parties may agree to a wide variety of procedural approaches to arbitration, subject to only a few provisos. 12 1 However, it
is clear that the subjective intent of one party cannot control the interpretation of a contract. 1 2 2 Thus, even if a party intends a contractual provision to have a certain effect, courts and arbitrators are
bound by the objective intent reflected in the agreement, as determined by the contractual language and governing law. Furthermore,
it has long been true that parties wishing to evade certain onerous
provisions of substantive law cannot do so simply by inserting an arbitration agreement into their contracts. 12 3
In some cases, states have cast a critical eye on what might be
considered an improper motive on the part of one or both of the parties. 124 Thus, for example, the State of California took the view that a
best-known adherent of the judicial class action, other common law and civil law nations have adopted the device. See The Annals, supra note 14; see also GLOBAL CLASS
ACTIONS EXCHANGE, http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu.
119. Numerous articles from as early as 1989 touted arbitration as an effective
means of eliminating the risk of a class suit. See Michael R. Davis, The Prospective
[sic] of In-House Counsel: Organization,Compliance/EnforcementPrograms,Negotiated Sales, Transfer, Termination and Advertising and Franchisee Sales, 486 PLII
Com. 561, 590 (1989); Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the
Predator?Banks Can Use ArbitrationClauses as a Defense, 7 Bus. L. TODAY 24, 25-26
(May/June 1998); Jean R. Sternlight, Should an Arbitration Provision Trump the
Class Action? No: Permitting Companies to Skirt Class Actions Through Mandatory
Arbitration Would Be Dangerous and Unwise, 8 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 13, 13 (Spring
2002).
120. See infra notes 217-19, 253-69 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
122. See Carideo v. Dell, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc., 149 Cal. App. 4th 1276, 1299 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007).
123. See Marc Blessing, MandatoryRules of Law Versus PartyAutonomy in InternationalArbitration, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 23, 23 (1997); DONALD F. DONOVAN & ALEXANDER K.A. GREENAWALT, Mitsubishi After Twenty Years: Mandatory Rules Before
Courts and InternationalArbitrators,PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 11, 43 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006).
124. Remedy-stripping provisions are strongly disfavored as a matter of public policy, even if they are embedded within an arbitration agreement. See David S.
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waiver of class proceedings 1 25 would be ruled unconscionable if it
was:
found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve
small amounts of damages, and when it [was] alleged that the
party with the superior bargaining power ha[d] carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of
individually small sums of money. 126
This provision was recently struck by the United States Supreme
Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion as being inconsistent
with, and therefore preempted by, the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA). 127 Although some view AT&T as heralding the end of class
arbitration (in that corporations will now routinely insert similar
waiver language into their arbitration agreements), this decision is
much more limited than it appears, in that it deals only with state
law preemption issues 12 8 and leaves courts free to strike class waivers on other grounds. 12 9 Indeed, several federal circuit courts take
the view that class waivers should be considered pursuant to the federal substantive law of arbitrability rather than state law of
unconscionability.13 0
Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, Arbitrability, and PreclusionPrinciples,38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 53-56 (2003).
125. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1110, 1162-63 (Cal. 2005).
California is not the only jurisdiction to exhibit a concern about powerful corporate
interests using arbitration as a means of reducing their exposure to legal claims. For
example, the European Union prohibits the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
the consumer context for precisely this reason. See Council Directive 93/13/EEC of
April 5, 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] O.J. L95/29; see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111st Cong. (2009) (proposing a similar
change in U.S. law). Several U.S. legislators have proposed a new form of the Arbitration Fairness Act in the wake of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011). See Arbitration Fairness Act, S. 987.IS, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act, H.R. 1873.IH, 112th Cong. (2011).
126. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1162-63.
127. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2010); AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
128. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (noting "class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA").
Furthermore, a number of state courts have found that certain practices are permitted under their state arbitration statutes, despite seemingly contrary U.S. Supreme
Court precedent. See Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 87 (Tex. 2011)
(allowing heightened review of an award under the Texas Arbitration Act despite the
decision in Hall Street Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008)).
129. See In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 193-94, 199 (2d Cir.
2011) (stating that "Stolt-Nielsen states that parties cannot be forced to engage in a
class arbitration absent a contractual agreement to do so. It does not follow, as [Amex
Travel] urges, that a contractual clause barring class arbitration is per se enforceable," and concluding that the waiver was void for public policy).
130. See id. at 194 (citing cases from the First, Second, and Third Circuits).
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Nevertheless, AT&T is important to this discussion because the
decision demonstrates how views about the nature of arbitration can
be issue-determinative. Because Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, viewed class arbitration as something other than "arbitration," he
was able to find that the California law striking certain waivers "interferes with arbitration" under the FAA.' 3 ' Notably, he arrived at
his conclusion about the nature of class arbitration based on his characterization of the speed, size, and formality of class disputes, as well
as the representative nature of class claims, all points that are considered in this article.13 2
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, considered class arbitration
and bilateral arbitration as equally legitimate forms of arbitration.
Because the California law could result in either bilateral or class
arbitration, the provision was consistent with the FAA. 3 3 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Breyer noted that a long line of existing
Supreme Court precedent "cautioned against thinking that Congress'
primary objective was to guarantee . . . particular procedural advantages. Rather, that primary objective [of the FAA] was to secure the
'enforcement' of agreements to arbitrate."' 3 4
Although there is much to be said about AT&T,' 3 5 it is sufficient
to note for the purposes of this discussion that the way in which the
various justices defined "arbitration" had a significant effect on the
outcome of the case. Because there has historically been little analysis of this issue, the point will doubtless continue to be litigated, an
131. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (claiming class arbitration "is not arbitration as
envisioned by the FAA").
132. See id. at 1748, 1750-51.
133. See id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. Justice Scalia's references to precedent were somewhat tortured, in one
instance claiming that the seminal case of Mitsubishi stood for the proposition that
"parties may agree to limit the issues subject to arbitration," id. at 1748, even though
Mitsubishi has long been understood to have expanded, rather than restricted, the
realm of arbitrable issues. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26 (1985). Justice Scalia also attempted to characterize the
purpose of the FAA as intending "to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements
according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings." AT&T, 131 S. Ct.
at 1748. Of course, it is the last portion of that sentence-"so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings"-that is problematic, since, as Justice Breyer noted, there is nothing in the FAA or in nearly a century's worth of Supreme Court precedent to support
that reading of the statute. Id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. The author discusses other aspects of the case in a forthcoming book from
Oxford University Press. See S.I. STRONG, CLASs ARBITRATION AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION: MASS CLAIMS IN THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SPHERE (forthcoming
2013).
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outcome that is made even more likely given the complicated and
contentious nature of waivers. 136
Waivers will be discussed more fully below. 137 The point to be
made at this stage of the analysis is that waivers demonstrate that
both respondents and claimants were aware of the possibility of collective action at the time of drafting, since without such a possibility,
a waiver would be unnecessary. However, this is not to say that the
only time that parties can be said to have considered the prospect of
large-scale legal actions is in cases of (1) express consent to or (2)
express prohibition of class or collective arbitration. Consent to class
suits can be found implicitly even in cases where the contract is silent
or ambiguous as to class treatment.1 3 8 Instead, the issue is always
one of objective intent, as reflected in the contract. In this regard,
class arbitration is the same as traditional forms of multiparty
arbitration.
As the preceding shows, the form of the arbitration agreement is
highly relevant to the question of whether multiparty proceedings
are proper. Since class arbitrations not only fall within established
paradigms for multiparty arbitration but also exhibit characteristics
of the more favorably viewed type of contractual relationship (i.e.,
hub-and-spoke relationships), there is nothing about class arbitration, at least in this regard, that could give rise to the charge that the
device "changes the nature of arbitration."13 9 Instead, the issue is
simply whether multiparty (i.e., class) proceedings are proper under

136. For example, many believe that certain rights-such as those enacted for the
benefit of the public at large rather than the benefit of a single individual-cannot be
waived by a single individual. See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 680 (Cal. 2000); BORN, supra note 5, at 1776, 1230-31; Hans Smit,
Class Actions and Their Waiver in Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 199, 203-04
(2004). However, class arbitration may involve certain public benefits that distinguish it from other forms of multiparty arbitration and that make the waiver discussion particularly difficult. See infra notes 173-94 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 173-94 and accompanying text.
138. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768
(2010) (stating that when the parties have not "reached any [explicit] agreement on
the issue of class arbitration, the arbitrators' proper task [is] to identify the rule of
law that governs in that situation," which in Stolt-Nielsen would have required reference "either to the FAA itself or to one of the two bodies of law that the parties
claimed were governing, i.e., either federal maritime law or New York law"); Strong,
Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 1059-83. The interpretive analysis used in these
situations is not the same as "allowling] any party to a consumer contract to demand
[class arbitration] ex post," as Justice Scalia incorrectly seemed to assume. AT&T, 131
S. Ct. at 1750.
139. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
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the facts arising in any particular case, not whether class arbitration
affects the fundamental nature of the process.
ii. Types of claims made
Courts and arbitrators considering the propriety of multiparty
arbitration in multi-contract scenarios do not focus solely on the form
of the arbitration agreements at issue. Decision-makers also consider
the types of claims at issue. Again, clear distinctions exist between
the two major categories of contractual relationships.
The first type of contractual relationships (i.e., those resembling
vertical strings) tend to involve a great deal of diversity in the kinds
of claims, counterclaims, and defenses that are asserted by the various parties. For example, the general contractor in a construction dispute usually mounts a very different defense than the various subcontractors do. In fact, the general contractor is likely to assert
claims, defenses, and positions that directly conflict with those taken
by other parties, an approach that can create serious procedural
problems. For example, the disparity between the parties' positions
may make it difficult to identify a sufficient unity of interest among
the various participants to allow the parties to be grouped for purposes of naming the arbitrators (an issue that plagued multiparty arbitration until the early 1990s).140 The absence of uniformity among
parties to string relationships can also lead to parties being asked to
14 1
reveal confidential or sensitive information to market competitors.
Interestingly, these issues do not arise in hub-and-spoke relationships. This is partly due to the fact that the parties who represent
the spokes of the wheel bring claims that are similar, if not identical,
on both a factual and legal level. Although this unity of interests and

140. The issue came to a head following the famous Dutco case. See BKMI Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Dutco Construction Co. Ltd. XV Y.B. COM. ARB. 124 (1990);
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 74, TT 792-93, 986-89; Platte, supra note
40, nn.71-75. Matters involving the selection of arbitrators are discussed below. See
infra notes 146-63 and accompanying text.
141. See Nicklisch, supra note 88, at 68; Joseph T. McLaughlin et al., Recent Developments in Domestic and International Arbitration Involving Issues of Arbitrability,Consolidationof Claims and Discovery of Non-parties, SMO90 ALI-ABA 757,
772 (2007); see also JOACHIM G. FRICK, ARBITRATION AND COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL
CoNTRAcTs 234 (2001) (claiming arbitral institutions should appoint arbitrators for
all parties if a conflict of interest might arise between groups of claimants or
respondents).
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circumstance can exist in traditional multiparty proceedings exhibiting a hub-and-spoke approach, 1 4 2 it is even more marked in class arbitration. 14 3 Because the class is asserting concordant legal
strategies, grouping the parties for procedural purposes such as the
selection of arbitrators becomes extremely easy. Furthermore, huband-spoke arbitrations tend not to involve market competitors as
part of the class, thus avoiding situations where parties must share
sensitive or confidential trade information. 144
Thus, the types of claims at issue in class arbitration fall easily
within the norms established for traditional multiparty proceedings.
Indeed, on this point, class arbitration is most closely aligned with
the less objectionable type of multiparty, multi-contract proceeding,
namely that involving a hub-and-spoke relationship. Therefore, class
arbitration cannot be said to "change[] the nature of arbitration"145
with respect to the type of claims asserted.
D.

Selection of Arbitrators

The preceding section alluded briefly to certain potential
problems associated with the selection of arbitrators in multiparty
disputes. It is useful now to take up that subject in more detail, since
the ability to select one's arbitrators has long been considered a fundamental right in arbitration.146 For years, the right was interpreted
so strictly that it acted as an almost insurmountable barrier to the
development of any form of multiparty arbitration. The problem
arose because virtually all of the contractual and institutional mechanisms for appointing arbitrators at that time contemplated bilateral
proceedings.1 4 7 The typical procedure then, as now, was that that
each party was entitled to select its own arbitrator, with the chair to
be nominated by the two party appointments. However, this approach ran into difficulties when there were more than two parties to
142. See Ostrager et al., supra note 47, at 444 (discussing traditional multiparty
arbitration with more than 140 parties).
143. Claimants in a class proceeding often allege precisely the same type of legal
injuries, even if the quantum of damages suffered may vary between different individuals. For example, if a financial institution imposed an improper monthly surcharge
on all credit card accounts, the claims would be legally identical, even if the amount
ultimately due to each individual claimant would depend on how long he or she held
an account with the respondent.
144. See Nicklisch, supra note 88, at 59-60, 68.
145. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
146. See BORN, supra note 5, at 1363-86.
147. See generally LEW ET AL., supra note 6, l1 16-11 to 16-29.
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the dispute. In the absence of any alternative appointment mechanisms or appointment agencies, many multiparty proceedings failed
to materialize, a result that only further reinforced the presumption
that bilateral proceedings were the only legitimate form of
arbitration.
Reforms came in the early 1990s, at least with respect to disputes that were known to involve multiple parties from the very beginning. 148 As a result, many national laws and arbitral rules now
provide that a neutral entity (such as a court or arbitral institution)
can appoint the entire tribunal in cases where the parties cannot
themselves agree on individual panelists or selection procedures. 149
Although these revised appointment mechanisms have been very
useful in arbitrations that are initially designated as having a multiparty character, the new procedures do not address situations
where multiparty status is asserted after the tribunal has been
formed. The late arrival of new parties can have serious ramifications, in that the arbitration must either (1) begin again, after a new
panel has been selected (thus incurring additional costs of time and
money for the original participants) or (2) proceed with the original
panelists (thus possibly infringing on the fundamental rights of the
new parties to name their own arbitrators).1 5 0
The problem with class arbitrations is that they do not fit easily
into one of these two models. For example, class arbitrations are usually filed on a classwide basis and thus can be considered multilateral
actions from the very beginning, an interpretation that allows parties
to benefit from rules and laws facilitating the selection of arbitrators
in multiparty scenarios.

148. The changes were inspired by the famous Dutco case. See BKMI Industrieanlagen GmbH v. Dutco Construction Co. Ltd. XV Y.B. CoM. ARB. 124 (1990);
792-93, 986-89.
FoUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 74,
149. See generally LEW ET AL., supra note 6, TT 16-11 to 16-29. This approach
clearly applies in multiparty arbitrations arising out of a single contract (the Dutco
dilemma), but can also be used in multi-contract situations. See BORN, supra note 5,
at 2103-04. In those cases, the arbitral institution typically undertakes an initial
analysis to determine whether the multiple contracts can support a multiparty proceeding, although the final determination as to multiparty status lies with the arbitral tribunal. See id. at 2104.
150. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2099-100. Of course, acceptance of the existing
tribunal could be made a condition ofjoining the arbitration. See DIS SUPPLEMENTARY
RULES, supra note 24, § 4.3.
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However, the precise identity of many of the parties in the class
is not known until well after the tribunal is constituted.' 5 The delay
arises because the tribunal first must decide that (1) class arbitration
is warranted under the arbitration agreement and (2) the facts in this
particular dispute warrant class treatment.152 Only then can the tribunal define the scope of the class and identify its individual
members. 15 3
This process can take months, which means that a large number
of parties are not fully "present" at the time the arbitrators are
named. Indeed, none of the participants in the early stages of the
proceedings-not the named claimants, the respondent(s), or the
members of the tribunal-will know the identity of all of the members of the class when the arbitration begins.' 5 4 This, of course, gives
class arbitration some of the attributes of late-arising multiparty proceedings. However, this practice does not lead to the same problems
in class arbitration as it does in traditional multiparty proceedings
due to the unique way in which unnamed parties demonstrate their
consent to join a class suit.
Under current forms of class arbitration, unnamed members of a
class do not officially become parties to the proceeding unless and until they have each been given the option of joining the action. Some
legal systems use an opt-in approach, wherein the party must affirmatively signal that he or she wishes to join the class, while others use
an opt-out approach, wherein the party is assumed to be part of the
class unless he or she indicates otherwise.' 5 5
151. In practice, claimants provide some description of the size of the class and the
characteristics of the members in the initial pleadings and update those assertions as
new information becomes available. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(1)(D).
152. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rules 3-6; JAMS CLASs AcTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rules 2-4.
153. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rules 3-6; JAMS CLASs AcTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rules 2-4.
154. There may be exceptions to this rule, such as when the class is relatively
small. See Class Determination Partial Final Award, Partners Two, Inc. v. Adecco
North Am., LLC, Case No. 11 114 03042 40 (Am. Arb. Ass'n, 2004), available at http://
www.adr.org/si.asp?id=3630 (seeking to certify a class of twenty-nine franchisees).
One issue that has not yet arisen concerns the extent to which late disclosure of the
identity of the members of the class might lead to conflicts of interest for one or more
of the arbitrators. Given the low monetary value of many individual claims in a class
suit and the low level of participation of many unnamed class members in the proceedings, it is likely that any such conflicts would or should be waived as de minimus.
However, the issue remains open.
155. Both the AAA and JAMS have adopted opt-out provisions. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 6(b)(5); JAMS CLAsS ACTION PROCEDURES, supra
note 17, rule 4(5). The DIS Supplementary Rules use an opt-in approach, although
those rules are better described as providing for collective arbitration rather than
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Potential class members may choose not to participate in an arbitration for any one of a variety of reasons. For example, some putative members of the class may believe that they can obtain a better
result by proceeding individually.15 6 Others may have concerns about
the identity of the panelists. Those who are subject to an opt-in regime may not understand the ramifications of a failure to signal their
consent to join the arbitration.15 7 Regardless of the reason for declining to join the class, choosing not to participate preserves both the
individual party's substantive legal claim and the right to name an
arbitrator in any future legal dispute.'15
The niceties of the opt-in/opt-out process mean that those unnamed parties to class arbitrations who choose to participate in the
proceedings can be said to have effectively ratified the choice of arbitrators. These class members, therefore, have no cognizable legal injury vis-A-vis the selection of arbitrators, unlike late-arriving parties
in traditional multiparty arbitrations who may not have the same
choice as to whether to become part of the arbitration. 5 9 Furthermore, potential class members who choose not to join a class proceeding do not suffer any cognizable legal injury vis-A-vis their
class arbitration. See DIS SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 24, section 4; Strong,
DIS, supra note 24, at 55-56.
156. Statistics suggest that individual claims can result in higher damage awards,
although many claimants will not wish to undertake the trouble of bringing an action
of their own. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-893) at 12 [hereinafter AT&T Petition].
157. A healthy debate has arisen as to the relative merits of an opt-in versus an
opt-out approach. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 32, at 476-77. One of the reasons
why a state may prefer to use an opt-out approach is because opt-out procedures are
traditionally considered to be more likely to result in a larger class than an opt-in
regime and thus carry more deterrent value. See Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an
Opt-Out Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis,
15 COLUM. J. Eu. L. 409, 431-34 (2009) (citing rationales for opt-in versus opt-out
classes).
158. Only if a party chooses to become a member of the class (either by opting in or
not opting out) does that individual claim become part of the class award. See
HarvardAward, supra note 13, at 144.
159. Of course, if a late-arriving party consented to consolidation or joinder, then
it can be said to have ratified the choice of arbitrators, just as late-arriving parties in
class arbitration do. However, some consolidation or joinder cases are made over the
contemporaneous objection of one or more parties. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 1 1638. To some extent, class arbitration can be seen as more similar to arbitrations involving intervention, at least on this point, since interveners have inserted themselves into the proceedings by choice, knowing who the arbitrators are. However,
unlike additional class members, interveners can bring significantly different substantive claims or defenses that might cause the existing parties to change their
views about the continuing desirability of certain panelists, thus raising arbitrator
appointment issues from the reverse perspective.
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substantive claims, since the determination of a class claim typically
does not affect the rights of any non-participating parties. 6 0
Interestingly, some respondents-even those that are present
since the beginning of the arbitration-may argue that their right to
select an arbitrator is injured as a result of the class procedure. The
premise would be that the respondent would have proposed or agreed
to different panelists, depending on who precisely was in the claimant group. 6 1 Since the respondent did not know the identity of all of
the members of the class when the panel was selected, the respondent could be said to suffer an injury when new parties officially become part of the class. Although this argument makes some logical
sense, it is unlikely to prevail because claims made by named and
unnamed members of a group are identical, or functionally identical,
as both a factual and legal matter, and thus should not affect the
selection of arbitrators. 16 2
Thus, class arbitration protects the fundamental right to select
one's arbitrators, regardless of whether the procedure is considered
more analogous to early-initiated multiparty arbitrations or late-arising multiparty procedures. Therefore, although class arbitration
raises some unique issues with respect to the selection of arbitrators,
these matters do not appear so serious as to give rise to claims that
class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration." 63
E.

Underlying Policy Considerations

The fifth and final means of comparing class and traditional multiparty arbitration involves the procedures' underlying policy considerations. Historically, the primary policy driving arbitration has been
party autonomy, with the intent of the parties-as reflected in the

160. The exception is when the class claim is against a limited fund. See
Nagareda, supra note 65, at 1118-19. Mandatory classes do exist in the judicial context as a matter of U.S. practice. See Linda S. Mullenix, No Exit: Mandatory Class
Actions in the New Millennium and the Blurringof CategoricalImperatives, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 177, 236-37 (2003) (discussing mandatory class actions in the United
States under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure versus permissive class actions under Rule 23(b)(3)).
161. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 459 (2003) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (claiming the corporate respondent had the right to name a different arbitrator in each of 3734 individual arbitrations, based on the specific language of the
arbitration agreements).
162. See id. at 451 (plurality opinion).
163. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
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arbitration agreement-standing at the center of the analytical process. 16 4 The emphasis on party intent remains at the core of the multiparty inquiry, although the decision-maker in multiparty disputes
must consider both (1) the intent to arbitrate the claims at issue and
(2) the type of procedure to be adopted.' 6 5
Although party autonomy is central to the arbitral process, efficiency concerns also play a role in both bilateral and multilateral proceedings. Interestingly, the weight given to efficiency may be
changing. For example, courts and arbitrators at one time routinely
denied parties' attempts to bring all related claims into a single arbitral forum, even if doing so was more efficient, since allowing claims
that were outside the scope of the arbitration agreement to go forward in arbitration would breach the principle of party autonomy.166
Parties' attempts to bring non-signatories into the proceedings often
met with similar results. 16 7 From these decisions was born the common understanding that the benefits of arbitration should not be considered as accruing to third parties, the courts, or the public at
large.16 8
Although these older decisions elevate party autonomy over efficiency, the tide seems to have turned, at least in some regards. Thus,
"procedural efficiency has been increasingly advocated by scholarly
writers and taken into account in practice by arbitral tribunals and
courts" on the grounds that the parties intended the arbitration to
proceed in an efficient manner. 1 69 Certainly an efficient procedure
164. See BORN, supra note 5, at 1059-60.
165. These questions involve what might be called primary and secondary consent. See infra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
166. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217, 221 (1985) (involving arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims and requiring "'piecemeal' litigation" and "the
possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums").
167. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 20-21
(1983) (stating that "federal law requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give
effect to an arbitration agreement," and that the agreement must be enforced "notwithstanding the presence of other persons who are parties to the underlying dispute
but not to the arbitration agreement").
168. See FRICK, supra note 141, at 231-32 (claiming "efficiency is not in itself a
goal of a dispute resolution mechanism, at least in proceedings that are not publicly
financed").
169. Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalizationof Arbitral Procedure, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1313, 1321-22 (2003); see also LEW ET AL., supra note 6,

16-92 (sug-

gesting multiparty arbitration may be appropriate if "it serves procedural economy");
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 74,

476; Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Juris-

diction and the Dimensions of "Consent," 24 ARB . INT'L 199, 243 (2008); Richard C.
Reuben, PersonalAutonomy and VacaturAfter HallStreet, 113 PENN ST. L. REV 1103,
1106 (2009) (suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court may have elevated efficiency
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can save both time and money, two goals that are said to be central to
the choice of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism.
Despite this potentially increased respect for efficiency, there is
still no presumption in arbitration that the parties agreed to create
the single most efficient procedure possible. 170 Furthermore, arbitrators still cannot impose a procedure that is inconsistent with the parties' wishes as expressed or implied in the arbitration agreement,
even to save money or time.
This can cause difficulties for class arbitration, at least if the procedure is viewed-as it sometimes is-as having the sole aim of
processing mass claims efficiently.1 7 1 However, efficiency in the class
context differs from efficiency in the non-class context in several significant respects.
For example, traditional multiparty arbitrations typically consider efficiency concerns by creating analogies to multiparty proceedings in court. In a judicial multiparty proceeding, benefits accrue to
both the parties (by resolving the dispute at a single time in a single

concerns over personal autonomy, at least in some regards, in Hall Street Associates,
LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 591-92 (2008)).
170. Interestingly, Justice Scalia in AT&T attempted to argue that bilateral is the
only proper form of arbitration because it is faster and more streamlined than class
arbitration, see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011), ignoring the fact that class arbitration is "more efficient than thousands of separate
proceedings for identical claims," id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, the
fact is that efficiency of proceedings is not a requirement under the FAA or U.S. case
law, although it may-as noted in this discussion-factor into the analysis.
171. This assumption may be based on language in the specialized rules on class
arbitration that indicates that class arbitration may be maintainable when "a class
arbitration is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule 4(b); see also
JAMS CLAss ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rule 3(b) (incorporating Rule 23 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by reference). However, a more detailed reading
of the rules shows that efficiency is but one of several factors that arbitrators are
required to take into account. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rule
4(b)(1-4); JAMS CLASs ACTION PEOCEDURES, supra note 17, rule 3(b). Furthermore,

even a brief review of the literature on judicial class actions demonstrates that class
suits involve more than mere efficiency goals. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 32, at

49-50 (discussing the "efficiency and enabling goals of class actions" and concluding
that the controversy over class claims is essentially "a dispute about what kinds of
lawsuits and what kinds of resolutions of lawsuits the legal system should enable"
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 49-123, 471-500; see also Burch, supra note 77, at 70-111
(discussing relative roles of public and private actors in regulatory schemes); Stempel,
supra note 6, at 391-92; Sternlight, supra note 54, at 28; Jack B. Weinstein, Compensating Large Numbers of People for Inflicted Harms, 11 DUKE J. COMP . & INT 'L L.
165, 172-74 (2001); Weston, supra note 54, at 1727.
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forum) and the court itself (by reducing the burden on judicial resources). However, the interest in preserving judicial resources disappears in arbitration, leaving only the benefits to the parties. These
personal benefits can be and often are displaced in arbitration by
principles of party autonomy.172
Class suits are somewhat different. In addition to the factors at
play in traditional multiparty proceedings, class actions and class arbitrations must also consider whether and to what extent the benefits
of the class proceeding inure to society as a whole.
Although class suits give rise to a variety of social benefits in
both the judicial and arbitral contexts, 173 several matters merit particular attention. First, class suits provide access to justice to parties
with low-value claims.1 7 4 Many of these types of claims are unlikely
to be heard on an individual basis, since the anticipated recovery is
often not expected to exceed the cost of bringing suit.1 7 5 Thus, the
failure to certify a class, either in court or arbitration, can sound the
"death knell" for a particular cause of action, no matter how meritorious the underlying claims may be. 176 Indeed, this is one of the reasons why Jean Sternlight has argued that the consequences of a
decision to refuse class certification are different than a refusal to
order consolidation. 177 Failure to consolidate different arbitral proceedings still allows disputes to go forward individually, albeit with

172. See HANOTIAU, supra note 20, 104-05 (discussing reasons why arbitration
agreements may not explicitly address multiparty issues).
173. In addition to access to justice and respect for deterrent and regulatory aims,
class suits also result in principled predictability, proportionality of the response to
multiparty actions, judicial economy, and the balancing of judicial activism and personal autonomy. See MULHERON, supra note 46, at 47-66 (noting that deterrence is
not common to all systems of class relief); Burch, supra note 77, at 92-111 (adding
transparency and information-sharing as additional aims); HENSLER ET AL., supra
note 32, 68-72; Sternlight, supra note 54, at 28; Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note
1, at 1043-55; Weston, supra note 54, at 1727.
174. Often these claims are made in the context of consumer actions, but class
suits in other fields can involve low-value individual claims as well.
175. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1769 n.7
(2010); In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 194, 197-99 (2d Cir. 2011).
176. See Grant Hanessian & Christopher Chinn, The U.S. Model for International
Class-Action Arbitration,75 Aus. 400, 407 (2009) (noting how failure to certify a class
led to abandonment of claim in the Canadian Supreme Court case of Dell Computer
Corp. v. Union des Consommateurs, [20071 2 S.C.R. 801 (Can.)); Weston, supra note
54, at 1730. Certification of a class also has consequences, in that respondents will
often seek to settle a case as soon as possible after class certification in order to avoid
the costs of defending such a suit. See Hanessian & Chinn, supra, at 407.
177. See Sternlight, supra note 54, at 86.
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some additional expense, whereas the failure to certify a class often
results in the claims languishing altogether.178
Secondly, class suits create a financial disincentive for corporations to engage in risky or socially unacceptable behavior. The issue
here also involves low-value claims, since the likelihood in such situations is that, absent a class remedy, only a few people will pursue
their claims in court or in arbitration. In such cases, the corporate
wrongdoer would be expected to (1) reap financial gains because not
all injuries are recompensed and (2) continue the injurious behavior,
since there is no adequate financial deterrent.1 7 9 Other corporate actors, seeing the absence of any financial ramifications for wrongdoers, might be inclined to adopt similarly risky behavior.
An interesting question has been raised recently, namely
whether the creation of a cost-effective arbitral forum (meaning one
where the claimant's recovery will exceed the costs of pursuing the
claim) is enough to offset the need for a class remedy. 18 0 This issue
was addressed only in passing by the majority in AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, although the dissent and other cases arising in the
wake of Stolt-Nielsen have considered the matter more comprehensively.1 s1 These opinions note that policy plays an important role in
the law relating to class suits. 1 8 2 Therefore, class waivers cannot be
allowed to stand in the context of antitrust claims, for example, since
"[e]radicating the private enforcement component from our antitrust
law scheme cannot be what Congress intended when it included
strong private enforcement mechanisms and incentives in the antitrust statutes."1 8 3 Similar legislative intent might also be found with
respect to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure more generally, since providing for the wide, trans-substantive availability of
class relief could very well be seen as a fundamental policy decision to
permit and encourage private actors to enforce public laws.1 8 4

178. See Hanessian & Chinn, supra note 176, at 407.
179. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
180. See AT&T Petition, supra note 156, at 28.
181. See AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1753; id. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting); In re Am.
Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 194, 197-99 (2nd Cir. 2011).
182. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting); In re Am. Express Merchs.'
Litig., 634 F.3d at 197-99.
183. In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d at 199.
184. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23; Strong, De-Americanization,supra note 23, at 503; see
also Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72, 2074 (2010) (requiring congressional
approval of rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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As part of this policy analysis, courts and arbitrators need to consider whether the adjudicatory function of arbitration is meant to fulfill the same role as the adjudicatory function of litigation. 8 5 If it is,
then courts may find it useful to consider whether the jurisdiction
whose law controls the issue 8 6 uses a particular form of dispute resolution-in this case, class suits-for a purpose beyond the simple
compensation of individual parties. 8 7 If such a purpose does exist
and is eliminated through the use of arbitration, then the state's entire regulatory scheme could be upset.' 8 8
Certain statements made in Stolt-Nielsen about the use of public
policy in class arbitration reflect how important it is to understand
the role that arbitration plays in a state's wider dispute resolution
scheme. For example, one of the reasons that the Supreme Court decided to vacate the arbitral award in Stolt-Nielsen was that the arbitral tribunal had allegedly substituted its own view of public policy
rather than relying on the principles stated in the governing law.18 9
In so doing, the arbitrators were said to have been acting as a common-law court, rather than as an arbitral tribunal. 9 0
This seems an odd conclusion, given the view of many commentators that arbitrators may properly take public policy into account to
the extent that the policy is found within the governing law.191 Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court itself has indicated that the failure to
consider relevant public policies can lead to the overturning of an
award, suggesting that arbitrators should affirmatively strive to take
185. Richard Posner has condemned the development of any form of private dispute resolution that "disserve[s] fundamental social interests-while serving all too
well the legal profession's narrow self-interest." Richard A. Posner, The Summary
Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary
Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 368 (1986).
186. Choice of law issues can arise in both domestic U.S. and international disputes. The analysis is particularly difficult in international class arbitration, since the
availability and form of class relief varies a great deal across national boundaries. See
Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 23, at 546-47.
187. See also supra note 171 and accompanying text.
188. See In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d at 199; see also Burch, supra
note 77, at 76; Christopher Hodges, Public and Private Enforcement: The Practical
Implications for Policy Architecture, in MASS JUSTICE: CHALLENGES OF REPRESENTATION AND DIsTmuRTIoN (Jenny Steele & Willem H. van Boom eds., 2011).
189. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1769
(2010) (noting "[tihe conclusion is inescapable that the panel simply imposed its own
conception of sound policy"). But see id. at 1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing
the majority's characterization as "hardly fair").
190. See id. at 1769.
191. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2177-84; MAURO RUBINO-SAMIVIARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAw AND PRACTICE 511-35 (2d ed. 2001).
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note of appropriate policy concerns to increase the likelihood of producing an enforceable award. 192
The issue may have been resolved to some extent by the Second
Circuit, which recently noted that:
while Stolt-Nielsen plainly rejects using public policy as a
means for divining the parties' intent, nothing in Stolt-Nielsen
bars a court from using public policy to find contractual language void. We agree with plaintiffs that "[t]o infer from StoltNielsen's narrow ruling on contractual construction that the Supreme Court meant to imply that an arbitration is valid and enforceable where, as a demonstrated factual matter, it prevents
the effective vindication of federal rights would be to presume
that the Stolt-Nielsen court meant to overrule or drastically
limit its prior precedent."' 93
As the preceding shows, application of the concepts of efficiency
and public policy in arbitration is a very complex undertaking.19 4
While it is impossible to resolve or even comprehensively introduce
the relevant issues in the space available, even this very brief discussion is sufficient to demonstrate that class arbitration does not fall
within the same analytical parameters as traditional multiparty arbitration, at least in this regard. Therefore, it is necessary to consider
whether class arbitration's underlying policy rationales can support
the claim that class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration."1 9 5 That point will be taken up again shortly.19 6
III.

CLASS PROCEEDINGS AND THE NATURE
OF ARBITRATION

As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, class arbitration
differs from other, more established, types of multiparty arbitration
in two important regards: the nature of the relief requested and the
underlying policy rationales.1 9 7 However, the fact that class arbitration is unique with respect to these matters does not perforce lead to
192. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
637 n.19 (1985); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc.,
484 U.S. 29, 42-44 (1987) (indicating that public policy that can be ascertained by
reference to the relevant law can and should be considered in arbitral context, lest the
award be rendered unenforceable); BORN, supra note 5, at 2181.
193. In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d at 194, 199 (citation omitted).
194. For a more complete discussion, see Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1,
at 1043-55.
195. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
196. See infra notes 327-38 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 51-81, 164-96 and accompanying text.
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the conclusion that class proceedings violate the fundamental principles of arbitration. Indeed, the preceding discussion identified several
ways in which class arbitration falls entirely within previously prescribed norms regarding multiparty arbitration.1 9 8
Those aspects of class arbitration that conform to existing arbitral practices and procedures can now be set aside, since there is no
way that those attributes can be said to "change [] the nature of arbitration."19 9 Instead, the remainder of the article will focus on those
elements of class arbitration that are distinctive to see if they have
some sort of effect on the nature of arbitration. To determine whether
they do, it is necessary to define the nature of arbitration.
This task is more difficult than it initially appears. Even though
most lawyers can list the various hallmarks of the procedure from
memory, most national statutes and international conventions on arbitration fail to define the term at all. 2 0 0 Instead, the task of delineating the arbitral process is left to courts and commentators. 2 0 1
This approach has created its own problems, however. For example, some courts have an unfortunate propensity to interpret the term
"arbitration" as including alternative dispute resolution devices (such
as mediation) that are patently not arbitration. 20 2 The intent is benign, in that judges simply want to give parties the benefit of certain
legal remedies or procedures that are associated with arbitration, but
the resulting effect is a lack of clarity about the proper boundaries of
arbitration. 203 The situation becomes even more complicated when
considered at the international level, since arbitration "does not always take the same form in different countries. Inevitably, each different form reflects local problems and sometimes a different
approach to the entire legal system." 204
198. For example, class arbitration does not raise any problems with respect to the
number of parties, the amount in dispute, the relationship between the parties, or the
selection of arbitrators. See supra notes 44-50, 82-105 and accompanying text.
199. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775. Thus, several of Justice Scalia's concerns in
AT&T can be set aside, as Justice Breyer suggested. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748, 1751-52 (2011); id. at 1758-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
200. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 212, 127; Rau, supra note 169, at 467.
201. See Bonn, supra note 5, at 212, 127; Rau, supra note 169, at 467.
202. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contractand Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L.
REV. 831, 858.

203. See id. at 427-28, 433-34; see also Richard C. Reuben, Process Purity and
Innovation: A Response to Professors Stempel, Cole, and Drahozal, 8 NEV. L.J. 271,
273 (2007) (noting "labels can be important in dispute resolution, both for the legitimacy of the process as well as its legal and ethical consequences").
204. RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 191, at 1; see also FouCHARD, GAILLARD,
GOLDMAN, supra note 74, 1 8.
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Commentators who have tried to fill this particular gap have also
experienced difficulties. 2 0 5 Some scholars refuse to attempt a definition altogether, preferring instead to list the various hallmarks of the
procedure without saying whether any of the particular attributes
are necessary for the proceedings to be classified as arbitration. 20 6
Other authors primarily prescribe the process by saying what it is
not. 2 07
Nevertheless, a few commentators have risen to the task. For example, Thomas Stipanowich has described arbitration in the United
States as involving "(a) a process to settle disputes between parties;
(b) a neutral third party; (c) an opportunity for the parties to be
heard; and (d) a final, binding decision, or award, by the third party
after the hearing." 2 08 Rend David, writing from the French perspective, has stated that arbitration is:
a device whereby the settlement of a question, which is of interest for two or more persons, is entrusted to one or more other
persons-the arbitrator or arbitrators-who derive their powers
from a private agreement, not from the authorities of a State,
and who are to proceed and decide the case on the basis of such
an agreement. 2 09
These statements approach the issue from the viewpoint of a single jurisdiction, but comparative inquiries yield similar results. Thus,
Gary Born has concluded that "virtually all authorities would accept
that arbitration is a process by which parties consensually submit a
dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the
parties, to render a binding decision resolving a dispute in accordance
with neutral, adjudicatory procedures affording the parties an opportunity to be heard." 210
Born's characterization "emphasizes the requirement that arbitration be conducted in a manner which affords the parties an opportunity to be heard in an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner," a
205.
206.

See David St. John Sutton et al., Russell on Arbitration 5 (23d ed. 2007).
See DOmKE, supra note 37, § 3:2, at 3-2 to 3-3 (listing a series of alternative

definitions of arbitration); LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 1 1-5 to 1-7; MUSTILL & BOYD,
supra note 10, at 38-50 (stating certain factors are material and necessary, but not
whether they are sufficient); JEAN-FRANcois POUDRET & StBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1-3 (2007) (listing various formulations);
Reuben, supra note 203, at 277- 87.
207. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6, l[ 1-31 to 1-54; POUDRET & BESSON, supra note

206, at 10-24.
208. Stipanowich, supra note 10, at 435-46.
209. FoucHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 74, f 7 (quoting RENt DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1985)).
210. BORN, supra note 5, at 217.
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distinction that is necessary "to distinguish arbitration from other
forms of alternative dispute resolution." 2 1 1 This focus on adjudication
is useful because it appears to describe a definitional requirement,
meaning a quality that must exist for a particular process to be considered "arbitration." Born's approach is also helpful because it highlights one of the reasons why class arbitration has come under attack
as constituting something other than "arbitration." Interestingly, despite the centrality of adjudication to the arbitral process, no consensus appears to exist as to what the adjudicatory process must entail.
Instead, a wide variety of procedures have been deemed permissible.
For example, arbitration can adopt highly formal procedures
mimicking litigation (although a slavish devotion to judicial
processes can and often does lead to criticism about arbitration's being too "legalistic"), or it can adopt procedures (such as documentsonly or fast track relief) that are not found in state courts. 2 12 The
range of acceptable procedures is so broad that Alan Rau has noted
that "[tlo look for the 'ideal type' of a particular process is to miss the
obvious point that the needs of contracting parties . .. are infinite in
their variety-as are the types of dispute resolution mechanisms that
they may devise." 2 13
This is not to say that every possible type of adjudicatory procedure is permitted. Certain minimal standards of due process or procedural fairness must be met if the so-called arbitration is to withstand
judicial scrutiny. 2 14 (Of course, the question of whether a particular
process is adjudicatory is slightly different from the question of
whether the same process is fair.)
It is also necessary to consider how new and developing forms of
private dispute resolution fit into the wider scheme of social justice
established by any particular state. Thus, Richard Posner has indicated that "[a]ny alternative to the trial must respect relevant legal
and institutional constraints." 2 1 5 Furthermore, "[any proposed reform must move the legal system in the right direction, where 'right'
211. Id. at 253.
212. See id. at 1232 n.442; see also SurrON ET AL., supra note 205, at 17.
213. Rau, supra note 169, at 504; see also Stipanowich, supra note 10, at 432-33.
214. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 1765; LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 25-36. The term
"due process" has been said to "refer to a number of notions with varying names under
different national laws, including natural justice, procedural fairness, the right or opportunity to be heard, the so-called principle de la contradiction and equal treatment." Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 169, at 1321-22.
215. Posner, supra note 185, at 368; see also DOMKE, supra note 37, § 1:1, at 1-3
(noting arbitration coexists with litigation as "part of the American system of administering justice"); Pierre Mayer, Comparative Analysis of Power of Arbitrators to
Determine Procedures in Civil and Common Law Systems, ICCA CONG. SER. No. 7,
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is defined in accordance with broad social policy rather than narrow
craft standards of success." 216
Adjudication as an essential element of arbitration appears to be
matched in importance by only one other concept: consent.2 17 However, these two attributes are more than just the twin pillars of arbitration, existing side by side, each in their own pure, unadulterated
form. Rather, they are inextricably connected and intermingled, since
"respect for the domain of private ordering has had a profound impact-not only on the types of disputes that may legitimately be submitted to arbitration-but also on the very form that the arbitration
process may assume, shaped as it is by private will."218 This phenomenon is clearly exhibited in the hybrid theory of arbitration, commonly considered to be the most apt of the various means of
describing the arbitral process, in that the hybrid theory explicitly
recognizes the central importance of both consent and adjudication in
arbitration while simultaneously refusing to give one principle precedence over the other. 2 19
24, 26 (1996) (noting arbitration is sometimes considered "a substitute for State justice, albeit of a private nature, but nevertheless pursuing the same ends"); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Keeping ArbitrationsFrom Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEv. L.J. 251, 260
(2007) (noting "arbitration is a substitute for adjudication by litigation"). However,
this characterization may not be true of all forms of arbitration. See DOMKE, supra
note 37, § 1:3, at 1-8 to 1-9 (noting that early precedent distinguished between commercial arbitration as a substitute for litigation and labor arbitration as a substitute
for avoiding industrial strife, but suggesting that these distinctions may no longer
apply).
216. Posner, supra note 185, at 368.
217. See FoucHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 74, 1 11. Commentators differ as to which of the two elements is the more important. For example, Alan Rau
believes arbitration "should be understood through the lenses of contract rather than
of adjudication." Rau, supra note 169, at 451.
218. Rau, supra note 169, at 466; see also id. at 452.
219. There are four theories of arbitration: contractual, jurisdictional, hybrid, and
autonomous. See BORN, supra note 5, at 184-86; LEW ET AL., supra note 6, $1 5-1 to 533; KATHERINE L. LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CHALLENGES TO
THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

68-71 (2003). Although

these theories are useful to consider, they provide little, if any, practical guidance to
those who are considering the propriety of any particular arbitral procedure, since the
theories are descriptive rather than definitive. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 1 5-5;
Rau, supra note 169, at 486 (noting definitions-as opposed to theories-refer to "the
highest, the most perfect, the historically contingent; or the model form, associated
with a process"). As such, it might seem that any discussion or debate about theory in
arbitration is irrelevant. See THOMAS CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 624 (2000) (likening such discussions to a "tempest in a teapot"). However, others have taken the view that "differences of opinion
over the theoretical basis for arbitration and the nature and legitimacy of the arbitral
process, are important because the way in which . . . arbitration is characterized affects the manner in which the extent and scope of applicable rules in arbitration are
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DOES CLASS ARBITRATION CHANGE THE NATURE
OF ARBITRATION?

A. Effect of a Negative Determination
Having laid out the parameters of "arbitration," it is now possible
to determine whether and to what extent the more distinctive elements of class arbitration deviate from the standard understanding
of the procedure. 2 20 This is an important analysis, since the conclusion that a particular procedure is not "arbitration" can impose significant burdens on parties. 2 2 1 For example, those who are involved
in processes that are not "arbitration" cannot take advantage of laws
that limit judicial review or that allow a court to compel participation
in the proceedings. 22 2 Furthermore, parties to a procedure that is
deemed to fall outside the scope of "arbitration" are not necessarily
able to ensure immunity for their neutrals or obtain easy international enforceability of their final award. 2 23 Indeed, courts' desire to
avoid these potentially devastating results may explain why, "as a
practical matter, if the parties' agreement provides for something labelled 'arbitration,' it is a rare case where this will be categorized as
something other than an arbitration agreement." 22 4
see also EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF
5-5 to 5-7.
(2010); LEW ET AL., supra note 6,
Certainly, the various theories of arbitration all support the conclusion reached
herein that consent and adjudication are central to any proper definition of arbitration, since each of the four theories currently in use focus on these attributes, albeit to
varying degrees. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 184-86; LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 1 5-1
to 5-33; LYNCH, supra, at 68-71.
220. Interestingly, none of the definitions of arbitration introduced above suggest
that the procedure must be private or confidential. See BORN, supra note 5, at 1765;
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 74, T 7; Stipanowich, supra note 10, at
435-36. Therefore, the fact that some class arbitrations may reflect a lower degree of
privacy and confidentiality than is presumed to occur in other forms of arbitration is
irrelevant to the discussion of whether class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration." Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010);
see also Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 23, at 513-16 (discussing the need,
extent, and rationale for decreased confidentiality in class arbitration). Furthermore,
class arbitrations that proceed ad hoc or under the JAMS Class Action Procedures do
not experience any decrease in confidentiality, and the disclosures required under the
AAA Supplementary Rules are in many ways similar to those in investment arbitration under the ICSID Arbitration Rules. See ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, http://icsid.
worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFilesbasicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf; Strong, De-Americanization,supra note 23, at 513-16; see also AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note
17, rule 9.
221. See Stipanowich, supra note 10, at 433-34.
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. BORN, supra note 5, at 216. Commentators have noted that courts may not
need to work so hard to find ways to classify proceedings as arbitration, since the
LYNCH, supra, at 65;
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 9-11

determined."
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Although judicial efforts to bring a wide variety of procedures
under the arbitral umbrella have led to a certain amount of confusion
at the jurisprudential level, it has had the salutary effect of creating
a remarkably simple analytical approach at the pragmatic level. Despite the diverse range of procedures that can constitute arbitration,
the ultimate question of whether a procedure qualifies as "arbitration" has always been entirely binary, meaning that a procedure either is or is not arbitration. This is beneficial because the recognition
of a spectrum of quasi-arbitral processes would likely require states
to devise a similarly diverse range of responses to those intermediate
procedures, further confusing arbitral law and practice.
Given Stolt-Nielsen's statement that class arbitration "changes
the nature of arbitration"22 5 and the suggestion in AT&T that class
arbitration may not be "arbitration as envisioned by the FAA,"2 2 6 the
question logically arises as to whether that sort of intermediate form
of arbitration ("quasi-arbitration") might be in the process of developing. Indeed, some might see two procedures that are unique to class
arbitration as reflective of the type of response that might be necessary in light of this sort of intermediate type of arbitration. The procedures in question-hybrid jurisdiction and the partial final award
system-involve a heightened degree of judicial involvement in class
proceedingS 2 27 and were developed in response to one of class arbitration's more unique attributes, namely the use of representative relief.2 2 8 While no conclusions can yet be drawn, several critical
questions need to be addressed.
First, when considering these mechanisms it is important to determine whether a court must involve itself in the arbitral procedure
(as would be the case with hybrid proceedings) or whether the court
simply may do so at the request of one of the parties (as would be the
case with rule-based proceedings). 2 2 9 Although class arbitration
conclusion that a particular procedure is something other than arbitration does not
leave the parties without a remedy in that they may nevertheless have recourse to
similar benefits as a matter of contract law. See MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 10, at
283 n.4; Rau, supra note 169, at 499.
225. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
226. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). Justice
Scalia appears to have been referring directly to some hypothetical forms of arbitration rather than class arbitration per se, but he may have meant to extend his characterization to class arbitration as well. See id. at 1752--53.
227. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rules 3, 5; JAMS CLASs AcTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rules 2-3; see also supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.

229.

See id.
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could be seen as deviating from arbitration's usual presumption of
judicial non-involvement in either instance, 23 0 the forceful insertion
of the court into the arbitral process would be far more problematic as
a matter of arbitral law and theory, since it would clearly infringe
upon arbitration's status as a private system of adjudication. 2 3 1
Because Stolt-Nielsen involved rule-based class proceedings, the
Supreme Court did not have the opportunity to consider the hybrid
approach. 2 32 Instead, the analysis focused on the partial final award
system. 233 Nevertheless, the decision failed to address several key issues, including the question of whether partial final awards may or
must be reviewed immediately upon being rendered. 2 34 Although the
majority suggested in dicta that immediate review was both permissible and necessary, Justice Ginsburg and the other dissenting justices took the view that the parties could not contract for judicial
review of such awards pursuant to Hall Street Associates, LLC v.
Mattel, Inc. 2 3 5 In the absence of a controlling rule, lower courts are
free to decide how to proceed, although the issue already appears to
be creating considerable difficulty. 2 36
Secondly, it is important to determine precisely what the court's
role would be if this sort of increased judicial involvement were to be
allowed. For example, if the court is allowed to hear challenges to
these partial final awards, then it is necessary to identify what the
scope and standard of review should be. Two possibilities appear to
exist. The less objectionable approach would involve judicial consideration of partial final awards under the same deferential standard and
limited scope of review as has traditionally been used in arbitration. 2 3 7 Although this kind of early review would be sought more systematically in class proceedings than is usually the case in other
230. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 15-1.
231. See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text.
232. AT&T did not consider arbitral proceedings at all, instead focusing on issues
relating to contractual waiver. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740, 1745 (2011).
233. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1779
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
234. The majority believed that the issue had been waived by the parties. See id.
at 1767 n.2; id. at 1778-79 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
235. See id. at 1767 n.2; id. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008)).
236. See Countrywide Fin. Corp. v. Bundy, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 714-19 (Ct. App.
2010) (outlining the complexity of the analysis); S.I. Strong, Opening More Doors
Than It Closes: Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 2010 LLOYD'S
MAR. & COM. L.Q. 565, 576 [hereinafter Strong, Opening More Doors].
237. See Born, supranote 5, at 2636-37; see generally LEW ET AL., supra note 6, [I
25-31 to 25-50.
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forms of arbitration, 2 38 there would not be such a break with existing
arbitral practice as to require a conclusion that the procedure reflected a form of quasi-arbitration.
The other alternative is much more troubling. In this case, courts
would not only permit judicial review of partial final awards, but
would use a less deferential standard such as review for a mistake of
law. 2 3 9 This approach would be problematic enough if the content of
the review were believed to focus only on procedural issues, 2 40 but it
is by no means clear that the matters that are at the heart of the two
partial final awards rendered under the specialized rules are indeed
procedural only. 2 4 1 Furthermore, this approach would not only mix
arbitral and judicial competence (something that has not been contemplated or permitted in the past),2 42 it would also increase judicial
workloads, perhaps significantly. 2 4 3 These matters are discussed at
more length below, 24 4 but it is useful to raise them now to demonstrate the possible ramifications of a determination that class arbitration is not really "arbitration."2 4 5

238. Partial final awards have long been available in arbitration, although such
awards have been rendered irregularly and have been largely discouraged. See BORN,
supra note 5, at 2434-35.
239. Judicial review of the merits of an award does still exist in some jurisdictions,
despite the movement away from such measures. See id. at 2638-39; see also Countrywide, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 714. Some may claim that this is the necessary result in
Stolt-Nielsen, given that the majority refused to return the issue of the interpretation
of the arbitration agreement to the arbitrators. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758,
1782 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). However, the issue was not explicitly discussed, although the majority's refusal to say whether the concept of vacatur for "manifest disregard" of law had survived the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Hall Street could
be seen as a means of leaving the door open for a future decision allowing review of
the merits of these kinds of partial final awards. See id. at 1768 n.3; Hall St., 552 U.S.
at 591-92.
240. See Reuben, supra note 169, at 1137 (arguing that the review and possible
appeal of procedural decisions would eliminate the kind of flexibility that is a hallmark of arbitration).
241. See Buckner, supra note 26, at 333-44 (concluding that the partial final
awards used in rule-based class arbitration are substantive in nature).
242. See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra note 74, 661; LEW ET AL., supra
note 6, T 15-1 to 15-3. But see Stempel, supra note 6, at 428-29 (calling for stringent
substantive review in cases involving "mass" arbitration).
243. See Reuben, supra note 169, at 1136; Reuben, supra note 203, at 293-96, 312.
244. See infra notes 303-13 and accompanying text.
245. See Stipanowich, supra note 10, at 433-34 (noting that only processes determined to be "arbitration" can take advantage of the concept of limited judicial review).
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B. Analyzing Class Procedures
It is now time to analyze whether and to what extent class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration."2 46 If one accepts the view
that "arbitration is a process by which parties consensually submit a
dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the
parties, to render a binding decision resolving a dispute in accordance
with neutral, adjudicatory procedures affording the parties an opportunity to be heard,"24 7 then some aspects of class arbitration are
clearly non-controversial. For example, class arbitration meets the
requirement that a dispute be submitted to a decision maker, selected by or for the parties, 2 48 and that the decision rendered be
binding.
However, difficulties may arise with respect to other aspects of
this definition. These issues can be analyzed under the general headings of consent and adjudication, not coincidentally the same two
principles that were described above as being central to the decision
whether to classify a procedure as "arbitration." 24 9 The question is
whether any of these concerns are so problematic as to (1) take class
arbitration out of the realm of permissible arbitral procedures entirely or (2) justify the creation of some form of quasi-arbitration in
response to the unusual nature of class proceedings.
The first option can be dismissed, at least in the United States,
since the U.S. Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to
strike class arbitration entirely but has consistently refused to do
so. 2 5 0 It is particularly telling that in both Stolt-Nielsen and Bazzle,
the two cases that discussed arbitral procedure most comprehensively, the Supreme Court clearly took the view that class arbitration
would be entirely proper if the parties had demonstrated express consent to such procedures. 25 1 Since the character of an arbitral procedure does not change merely by virtue of the nature of the consent at
246. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
247. BoRN, supra note 5, at 217.
248. Although some debate may exist with respect to the way arbitrators are selected in class arbitration, those issues are no more troubling than those involving
other forms of multiparty arbitration in a post-Dutco world. See Nater-Bass, supra
note 64, at 683-84; supra notes 146-63 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 208-19 and accompanying text.
250. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen,
130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also supra note 15 and accompanying
text.
251. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768-69; Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 450 (plurality
opinion).
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issue, it therefore appears that whatever concerns the U.S. Supreme
Court may have about class arbitration, they do not rise to a level
that would require taking the device out of the purview of "arbitration" altogether. 2 52
That leaves the second of the two options, namely whether class
arbitration is so inherently problematic that it justifies the creation
of a new form of quasi-arbitration in response to some special attribute of class proceedings. Therefore, the following discussion considers whether and to what extent those attributes that are unique to
class arbitration fall within established arbitral norms, first with respect to the element of consent and second with respect to the issue of
adjudication.
i. Consent in class arbitration
If arbitration is agreed to be "a process by which parties consensually submit a dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker," 25 3
then consent obviously plays a necessary part of the proceedings. Indeed, the first question raised in every arbitration is whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate this particular dispute. This issuewhich can be termed "primary consent" -is usually not directly challenged in class arbitration, since all the parties have signed agreements indicating their consent to arbitrate their disputes. 25 4 Instead,

252. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
633 (1985) (noting that courts that agree to allow certain complex claims to go to
arbitration pursuant to the parties' express agreement cannot later claim that those
matters are "inherently insusceptible to resolution by arbitration"). Indeed, it is this
precedent that makes Justice Scalia's recent suggestion in AT&T that class arbitration is or may not be "arbitration as envisioned by the FAA" so jarring. See AT&T, 131
S. Ct. at 1752-53 (referring to several hypothetical types of arbitration that might or
might not include class proceedings).
253. BoRN, supra note 5, at 217.
254. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text. Primary consent is the core
concern in disputes involving non-signatories, since the absence of a signed arbitration agreement raises questions as to whether a party can be said to have agreed to
arbitrate the dispute at hand. See id. Questions regarding the scope of the arbitration
agreement would also fall within the ambit of primary consent, but that analysis is
the same regardless of whether bilateral, multilateral, or class proceedings are alleged. Indirect challenges to primary consent can arise through arguments about unconscionability. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 724-32; DOMKE, supra note 37, § 8:25.
However, since unconscionability was not raised in Stolt-Nielsen, it cannot be a basis
for the claim that class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration." Stolt-Nielsen,
130 S. Ct. at 1775.
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class arbitration focuses for the most part on what can be called "secondary consent," meaning consent to this particular type of procedure. 2 5 5 This concept is by no means unique to class disputes, since
traditional multiparty arbitrations are also required to establish secondary consent in cases where the arbitration agreements are silent
or ambiguous as to multiparty treatment. 25 6 However, a new layer
may have been added to the analysis as a result of Stolt-Nielsen.2 57
In the past, arbitrators have been able to order both class and
traditional multiparty arbitration on the basis of either express or
implied consent. 25 8 However, several commentators have suggested
that Stolt-Nielsen requires parties to show express consent to class
arbitration. 25 9
That interpretation appears to be based on two separate statements made in Stolt-Nielsen. First, the majority indicates that "we
see the question as being whether the parties agreed to authorize
class arbitration."2 60 Second, the opinion declares that:
[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration ...
is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of
the parties' agreement to arbitrate. This is because class-action
arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree
255. The need to establish secondary consent in both class and traditional multiparty arbitration arose as a result of the longstanding bias in favor of bilateral arbi16-1 to 16-4; see also supra note 147 and
tration. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6,
accompanying text.
256. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 489
F.3d 580, 587 (3d Cir. 2007); Emp'rs Ins. Co. of Wausau v. Century Indem. Co., 443
F.3d 573, 578 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting consolidation was a procedural decision for the
arbitrator); see also Volt Info. Servs. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (upholding terms of arbitration agreements); supra
note 96. Sometimes in multiparty scenarios the question is phrased as "with whom
am I required to arbitrate?" See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774; Rau, supra note 169,
at 254 (writing prior to Stolt-Nielsen).
257. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.
258. See supra note 96.
259. See Sarah Cole, Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds - Major Victory for Business,
ADR PROF BLOG (Apr. 27, 2010), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=1268 (last visited
June 30, 2011) (stating "a logical interpretation of the opinion suggests that silent
clauses will not be interpreted to permit class action arbitration"); Paul Kirgis, More
on Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, ADR PROF BLOG (Apr. 29, 2010),
www.indisputably.org/?p=1284 (last visited June 30, 2011) (claiming "[elffectively the
case holds that silence on the issue of class arbitration can only be read as precluding
class arbitration"); Jean Sternlight, Sternlight on Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds, ADR
PROF BLOG (Apr. 29, 2010), www.indisputably.org/?p=1287 (last visited June 30,
2011) (claiming the decision "will mean the end, almost immediately, of class-wide
arbitration in all contexts").
260. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.
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that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply
agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator. 26 1
However, the quoted language does not appear to go as far as
commentators suppose. 26 2 Instead, the statements appear to be limited to the proposition that class arbitration cannot be ordered based
on nothing more than the decision to arbitrate. That, however, has
always been true in cases involving secondary consent in either the
class or traditional multiparty context. 2 6 3
Instead, a better reading of Stolt-Nielsen would be that the decision contemplates the same kind of interpretive analysis that has always been used to determine the existence of secondary consent in
multiparty scenarios. 2 64 Support for that conclusion is found in language indicating that "the arbitrators' proper task was to identify the
rule of law that governs" in cases of contractual silence. 2 6 5 If express
consent were required, there would be no need to identify the applicable rule of law to determine that issue. The majority also explicitly
stated that it had "no occasion to decide what contractual basis may
support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize class-action arbitration."2 66 Again, this statement can only be taken to mean that
the issue remains subject to existing law unless and until the Supreme Court makes a further ruling.
Finally, it would be remarkable if Stolt-Nielsen were read as requiring class proceedings to demonstrate a heightened form of consent when arbitrators have traditionally been both empowered and
encouraged to exercise their discretion to determine any necessary
procedures in the absence of party agreement. 26 7 Given the lack of
detailed discussion by the Supreme Court on this question, it would
appear inappropriate to assume that the Court meant to extend the
law in such a manner.2 6 8
261. Id. at 1775.
262. See Strong, Opening More Doors, supra note 236, at 566-68.
263. See Strong, Sounds of Silence, supra note 1, at 1059-83.
264. Alan Rau would apparently set a relatively low standard for this type of issue, at least where all the parties had signed an arbitration agreement. See Rau,
supra note 169, at 242-44 (discussing concentric circles of consent).
265. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768.
266. Id. at 1776 n.10.
267. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6, [[ 12-12 to 12-13.
268. Although Justice Scalia in AT&T suggested that it was "unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress meant to leave the disposition of these procedural requirements to an arbitrator," AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751
(2011), the Supreme Court previously had several opportunities to speak more directly on the scope of arbitral power and declined to do so, see supra notes 58-59 and
accompanying text.
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Therefore, although the issue of consent does arise in Stolt-Nielsen, there is no indication that the Supreme Court believes that class
arbitration violates the fundamental nature of arbitration with respect to the procedure's consensual element. Instead, to the extent
that consent is discussed, the Supreme Court merely appears to be
reinforcing the need to establish secondary consent.
Furthermore, even if Stolt-Nielsen were taken to mean that express consent is now necessary, the element of consent is being raised
in response to concerns about class procedures. Because actions
taken in response to any alleged violations of the fundamental nature
of arbitration cannot also be said to be the cause of such violations,
there does not appear to be anything about the consent element of
class arbitration that "changes the nature of arbitration."2 6 9 If any
such change exists, it must relate to arbitration's adjudicatory element, which is considered in the next section.
ii. Adjudication in class arbitration
To conform with the adjudicatory requirement of arbitration, the
process in question must involve "a non-governmental decisionmaker, selected by or for the parties," who is "to render a binding
decision resolving a dispute in accordance with neutral, adjudicatory
procedures affording the parties an opportunity to be heard." 270 The
proceeding must also "be conducted in a manner which affords the
parties an opportunity to be heard in an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner."2 7 1 If class arbitration violates one of these precepts,
then the procedure can be said to "change[] the nature of
arbitration." 2 72
Evaluating class arbitration in light of these adjudicatory requirements gives rise to several possible issues, both with respect to
the unique aspects of class arbitration identified previously and with
respect to several additional points made by the parties in Stolt-Nielsen and AT&T. 2 7 3 The specific topics to be discussed in this section
involve excessive formalities, excessive judicial intervention, concerns about the competence of the arbitral tribunal (which include
issues regarding public policy rationales), and the nature of representative relief. Each item is addressed in turn below.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
51-81,

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
BoRN, supra note 5, at 217.
Id. at 253.
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1775.
See AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1740; Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758; supra notes
164-96 and accompanying text.
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Excessive formalities
The first charge to be leveled against class arbitration is that it
requires an excessive number of procedural formalities. Thus, for example, submissions to the Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen claimed
that "class arbitration reflects a stark break from traditional arbitration, whereby a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition
of arbitration."' 274 This assertion suggests that only the most barebones procedures can constitute "arbitration." Because "class arbitration, and the extensive, formal procedures that it necessarily entails,
is not 'essential to a determination of [the parties'] rights,"' class proceedings are somehow said to be outside the scope of arbitral
norms. 2 7 5 This theme is repeated by Justice Scalia in AT&T, although it is challenged by Justice Breyer and the other dissenting
justices. 2 76
While it is indeed true that class arbitration can be more formal
than some other types of arbitration, 2 77 the existence of court-like
procedures has never raised questions about the legitimacy of an arbitration proceeding outside the class arbitration context. 2 7 8 Instead,
it is the absence of any adjudicatory hallmarks, such as a written
274. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.,
130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198) [hereinafter Brief for the Chamber] (citation
omitted); see also Initial Brief of Petitioners at 13, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds
Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-1198).
275. Brief for the Chamber, supra note 274, at 3.
276. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1751; id. at 1758-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
277. The cry of excessive legalism depends largely on what is being compared. For
example, class arbitration is not significantly more complicated than international or
investment arbitration. Compare AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, with
ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION (effective Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitrationlid4199/index.html, LCIA ARBITRATION RULES (effective Jan. 1, 1998), http://
www.1cia.org/DisputeResolution Services/LCIA Arbitration Rules.aspx, and ICSID
ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 220. Since arbitration under the ICC, LCIA, and ICSID Arbitration Rules all fall squarely within the definition of arbitration, it would
appear inappropriate to conclude that class arbitration violated arbitral norms as a
result of being too formalistic.
278. See BORN, supra note 5, at 1744 (noting arbitration "may involve using relatively conventional litigation procedures, much like those in some national courts").
Indeed, some commentators specifically suggest that newcomers to arbitration emulate the kind of advocacy techniques used in domestic litigation. See Kevin R. Casey &
Marissa Parker, Strategies for Achieving an Arbitration Advantage Require Early
Analysis, Pre-HearingStrategies,and Awards Scrutiny, 26 ALTS. HIGH COST LIT. 167,
168 (2008) (claiming "[elffective arbitration advocacy is remarkably similar to model
advocacy in court"); Ariana R. Levinson, Lawyering Skills, Principlesand Methods
Offer Insight as to Best Practices for Arbitration, 60 BAYLOR L. REv. 1 (2008). The
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award, written submissions, witness testimony, oral hearings, or argument, that is more likely to lead to the conclusion that a procedure
is not "arbitration."27 9 It is also true that the amount and type of
adjudicative formality can vary according to the nature of the claim
asserted. Thus, for example, the procedural approach used in some
arbitrations "can closely resemble proceedings in the commercial
courts" at times, "[p]articularly in major matters" where a great deal
of money is at stake. 28 0
This is not to say that experts have not advised parties to avoid
excess formality in arbitration. However, the intent in those instances appears to have been to keep costs down and avoid limiting
the creativity that is possible in arbitration rather than impose any
restrictions on possible procedures. Thus, for example, commentators
who have criticized the formality of certain specialized rules on class
arbitration have done so not because the suggested procedures violate the nature of arbitration, but because the rules "fail to engage
with the possibilities of class arbitration" and take an "impoverished
view" of the procedure by not taking advantage of the possibility of
individually tailored procedures and remedies that are the hallmark
of arbitration. 28 1
Thus, the adjudicatory requirement in arbitration is better understood as a floor rather than a ceiling. 28 2 Further evidence of the
merit of this approach can be seen in the fact that parties have always been allowed to choose to have formal rules of evidence or procedure apply in an arbitration. Indeed, "an aspect of the parties'
autonomy and the arbitrators' procedural discretion is the freedom to
adopt more elaborate or judicial' procedures, either when this is what
particular parties desire in a specific case or where such procedures
are best-suited for handling one or more aspects of a dispute." 2 83
wisdom of these sorts of suggestions has been questioned, particularly in the international realm, but not on the grounds that such measures violated the nature of arbitration. See S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: Special
Skills, Special Sources, 20 Am. REV. INTL ARB. 119, 124 (2009).
279. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 234 (questioning whether "quality arbitration" is
indeed a form of arbitration); see also id. at 1747 (noting national courts that have
criticized arbitration for failing to adopt, inter alia, formal rules of evidence).
280. Id. at 1746.
281. Weidemaier, supra note 36, at 94-95; see also Smit, supra note 136, at 211.
282. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 253 (suggesting the more difficult task will be
whether "relatively informal or technical procedures" qualify as arbitration, not
whether more formal procedures do).
283. Id. at 1746-47; see also id. at 1335-38, 1765, 1782 (noting that the usual
contemporary practice is not to have recourse to national rules of procedure); LEW ET
AL., supra note 6, 1 21-12 to 21-18.
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Should the parties disagree with the approach chosen by the arbitral
tribunal, they can impose their own procedural rules by concluding
an express agreement to that effect, mid-arbitration. 284
The difficulty, of course, is if only one party objects to the arbitrators' procedural decisions. This situation arises with regularity in all
types of arbitration, including bilateral proceedings. Because a unilateral objection cannot overcome the parties' prior grant of discretion to the arbitral tribunal, the objecting party has no alternative
but to wait until the arbitration has concluded and challenge the propriety of the procedure in court. 2 85 Tellingly, no cases have been
found where a judge has vacated or refused enforcement of an award
simply because the procedures used in the arbitration were too similar to those used in national court. Indeed, the opposite was true in
some jurisdictions until quite recently. 28 6
Based on the preceding, it therefore appears incorrect to claim
that the number and type of procedural formalities used in class arbitration somehow "changes the nature of arbitration."2 8 7 If such a
change exists, it must lie elsewhere.
Excessive judicial involvement
The second adjudicatory issue to consider involves the characterization of arbitration as a private dispute resolution mechanism using "a non-governmental decision-maker, selected by or for the
parties, to render a binding decision." 288 The question here is
whether governmental decision-makers (i.e., courts) are so involved
in class arbitration, either through the use of hybrid jurisdiction or
early review of partial final awards, as to take the procedure out of
the realm of "arbitration."
Interestingly, the practices at issue here are directly related to
one of class arbitration's more unique characteristics: the grant of
representative relief.28 9 This gives rise to a very subtle analytical distinction. If the various forms of judicial intervention were created as
a response to a particular aspect of class arbitration and are not
284. See BORN, supra note 5, at 1757.
285. See id. at 2593-95. Both domestic annulment and international enforcement
procedures tend to use relatively narrow grounds for avoiding arbitral awards. See
LEW ET AL., supra note 6,

i 25-31 to 25-50, 26-65 to 26-66.

286. As recently as 1989, English law appeared to require the application ofjudicial rules of evidence in arbitration. See MUSTILL & BOYD, supra note 10, 352-54; see
also BORN, supra note 5, at 1746-47.
287. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
288. BORN, supra note 5, at 217.
289. See supra notes 224-45 and accompanying text.
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themselves a necessary feature of the device, then they can be altered
if they are found to be too problematic. However, if the practices
themselves constitute a core, necessary feature of class proceedings,
then they cannot be changed, even if they violate the adjudicative
element of arbitration.
For the reasons stated above, increased judicial intervention appears to be the result of practical and jurisprudential concerns about
the ramifications of representative relief rather than a necessary, independent element of class suits. 2 9 0 Nevertheless, the following discussion will analyze these practices on their own merits, as if the
court's expanded role were an integral part of class arbitration, since
a determination that the procedures in question fall within accepted
adjudicatory practices will render the question moot at all levels of
application. Given that the two procedures have been introduced
above, only a brief description of the various practices is needed
here. 2 9 1
The first type of judicial intervention to consider involves the socalled hybrid model of adjudication, wherein the court retains responsibility for certification of and notice to the class, as well as control
over fairness approvals of the final award. 2 92 This approach-which
grants the court the same supervisory powers that exist in judicial
class actionS293-was adopted out of a concern for the procedural
rights of unnamed class members, who were thought to be particu2 94
larly at risk given the representative nature of the proceedings.
290. See supra notes 224-45 and accompanying text. This conclusion is also based
on the fact that (1) several different models of class arbitration have arisen over the
years (including rule-based approaches designed by the AAA, JAMS, the NAF, and, to
a lesser extent, the DIS, as well as the common law hybrid model) and (2) representative relief exists in a variety of forms in judicial contexts. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY
RULES, supra note 17; DIS SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 24; JAMS CLAsS AcTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17; NAF ARB. CLASS PROCEDURES, supra note 17; The
Annals, supra note 14; MULHERON, supra note 46; Strong, De-Americanization,supra
note 23, at 498-508.
291. See supra notes 224-45 and accompanying text.
292. See Buckner, supra note 26, at 320-23 (further discussing the hybrid models
used in various state courts).
293. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Blue Cross of Cal. v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d
779, 785 (Ct. App. 1998); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 867
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991); Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 360-61 (S.C.
2002), vacated, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
294. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209, 1215 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Dickler, 596
A.2d at 866-67; Buckner, supra note 26, at 320-23; Sternlight, supra note 54, at
52-53; Weston, supra note 54, at 1741-42.
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Despite its good intentions, the hybrid model can run afoul of the
adjudicatory element of arbitration to the extent that the court's involvement takes the decision-making process out of the exclusive control of the non-governmental actor (i.e., the arbitral tribunal). To say
that the decisions being made by the court are "merely procedural" is
no answer, since there is a fundamental difference between ensuring
the procedural fairness of the arbitral process and substituting judicial determinations on matters of procedure for arbitral decisions on
those same issues. 29 5 Furthermore, it is by no means clear that the
matters in which the courts are involving themselves (i.e., certification of and notice to the class, as well as control over fairness approvals of the final arbitral award) are indeed entirely procedural.2 9 6
Although hybrid jurisdiction gives rise to serious concerns with
regard to arbitration's adjudicatory requirement, there are questions
as to whether this method of class arbitration is still in use. Detailed
data is impossible to compile due to the confidential nature of the
proceedings, 29 7 but it would appear that the hybrid approach was primarily, if not exclusively, used in the early days of class arbitration,
with one commentator going so far as to claim that the hybrid model
has been "swept away."2 98 Nowadays, parties and arbitrators appear
to prefer to adopt specialized rule sets such as the AAA Supplementary Rules or the JAMS Class Action Procedures to govern the proceedings, in whole or in part, even if the original arbitration
agreement does not require the application of those procedures. 299

295. See BORN, supra note 5, at 1781 (noting "[j]udicial orders purporting to establish arbitral procedures would directly contradict the parties' objectives in agreeing to
arbitrate"); Reuben, supra note 169, at 1137 (arguing that the review and possible
appeal of procedural decisions would eliminate the kind of flexibility that is a hallmark of arbitration).
296. See Buckner, supra note 67, at 230 (taking the view that the hybrid theory
does intrude on matters of substance).
297. Despite the outcry about decreased confidentiality in class arbitration, the
process is still largely a private affair. Only two organizations-the AAA and ICSIDpublicize any information at all about ongoing proceedings. See Strong,De-Americanization, supra note 23, at 515. Other arbitral institutions (including JAMS) do not
make any information known about ongoing proceedings, and there is no way to track
ad hoc arbitrations unless and until the parties themselves divulge the information
through press releases or judicial actions. Furthermore, confidentiality does not seem
necessary for a process to be considered "arbitration." See supra note 220.
298. Buckner, supra note 26, at 301.
299. See AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULEs, supra note 17; JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17.
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Thus, for example, the parties in Stolt-Nielsen agreed to adopt portions of the AAA Supplementary Rules after it became clear that
class proceedings were possible. 30 0
Although this second type of class arbitration constitutes an improvement over the hybrid model, rule-based class proceedings are
not themselves without controversy. Here, the concern about excessive judicial involvement relates to two partial final awards that may
be brought to a court's immediate attention by one or more of the
parties. 3 0 1 As suggested previously, the scope and standard of judicial review of these awards have not yet been fully defined, which
makes detailed analysis difficult. 30 2 Nevertheless, some observations
can be made.
First, rule-based class proceedings may preserve the private nature of the adjudicative process by inserting several critical degrees of
separation between the court and the arbitral tribunal. Because judicial involvement occurs only at the request of the parties, the autonomy of the non-governmental decision-maker is respected and the
"taint" of state involvement is thereby removed, unlike in hybrid procedures, where the courts made the affirmative choice to insert themselves into the proceedings. 3 0 3
Secondly, even if the parties invite courts to become involved,
that invitation may be declined. Two responses are possible. On the
one hand, courts may decide as a general rule that systematic interim
review is improper, based on precedent that prohibits contractually
300. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765
(2010).
301. See generally AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17, rules 3, 5; JAMS
CLASS AcTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17, rules 2-3.
302. See supra notes 224-45 and accompanying text. Furthermore, most of the
debate concerning the propriety of the partial final award system has focused more on
whether parties can contractually expand the opportunity for judicial review than on
any potential infringements of the adjudicatory nature of arbitration. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Kristin M. Blankley, Did the Arbitrator "Sneeze?" Do Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction over "Interlocutory"Awards in
Class Action Arbitrations?,34 VT. L. REv. 493, 505, 522-27 (2010); Vikram Raghavan,
Heightened Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards: Perspectives from the UNCITRAL
Model Law and the English ArbitrationAct of 1996 on Some US Developments, 15 J.
INT'L ARB. 103, 121-23 (1998); Reuben, supra note 169, at 1105-06.
303. Although only one party is needed to seek the court's review, the other party
has already agreed to the early review process by virtue of accepting the adoption of
the rule set in question. Furthermore, even if an arbitral tribunal operating outside a
formal rule set were to take it upon itself to use a system of partial final awards, the
parties still could not be heard to complain so long as the tribunal was working within
the proper confines of its discretion in rendering partial final awards. See BORN, supra
note 5, at 2430-35.
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expanded review of final awards.3 04 This would result in a blanket
prohibition on interim review of any partial final awards rendered
under the specialized rules for class arbitration. On the other hand,
courts may take more of a case-by-case approach in deciding whether
to hear these sorts of interim challenges. This second alternative may
be the more likely, at least in the short term, given the absence of any
definitive answer from the Supreme Court on this issue.3 0 5
When considering the propriety of rule-based class arbitrations,
judges should be aware that there is nothing about the use of partial
final awards that can be said to "change [] the nature of arbitration." 30 6 While the use of such awards has generally been discouraged in both bilateral and multilateral proceedings,3 0 7 the disfavor
does not seem to stem from the view that partial final awards violate
arbitration's adjudicatory function. Instead, such awards are primarily opposed on more pragmatic grounds in that "[i] nterlocutory judicial review of an arbitral tribunal's procedural decisions would
frustrate" a variety of objectives of arbitration "while also imposing
substantial risks of delay and appellate second-guessing on the arbitral process."3 0 8 However, the mere fact that the process might be
better off without interim review does not determine whether that
particular practice violates the nature of arbitration, since parties
and arbitrators are entitled to, and often do, make procedural decisions that are counter to the goals of speed and efficiency. 30 9
Interestingly, the majority in Stolt-Nielsen did not identify this
aspect of class arbitration as being problematic in any way. Instead,
the majority appeared (albeit in dicta) to be very much in favor of
allowing early review of partial final awards. 3 10 This suggests that
the use of partial final awards did not contribute to the majority's
304. This is the approach advocated by Justice Ginsburg. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.
Ct. at 1779 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576, 591-92 (2008); Countrywide Fin. Corp. v. Bundy, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705,
714-19 (Ct. App. 2010) (discussing interplay between state and federal law);
Raghavan, supra note 302, at 121-22.
305. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767 n.2; see also BORN, supra note 5, at
2430-35; Strong, Opening More Doors, supra note 236, at 568.
306. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
307. See BORN, supra note 5, at 2815-26; FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN, supra
note 74, 91 1359-62; LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 1 24-14 to 24-23; POUDRET & BESSON,
supra note 206, at 644.
308. BORN, supra note 5, at 1781 (but also noting that "interlocutory judicial involvement in procedural decisions in an ongoing international arbitration" may violate the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)).
309. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
310. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767 n.2.

HeinOnline -- 17 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 261 2012

262

Harvard Negotiation Law Review

[Vol. 17:201

conclusion that class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration."3 1 1 Thus, the process appears to pass muster as constituting a
proper adjudicatory mechanism in arbitration. However, this conclusion may change, depending on how issues relating to the scope, standard, and availability of judicial review are resolved.3 12 Therefore,
while this practice does not currently appear to "change[] the nature
of arbitration,"3 1 3 courts and commentators should nevertheless
maintain a close watch on future developments.
Concerns about the competence of the arbitraltribunal
A third issue that could affect the adjudicatory legitimacy of
class arbitration involves the competence of the arbitral tribunal to
address claims of this nature and complexity. Although there is nothing in Stolt-Nielsen that states directly that arbitrators are incompetent to handle the demands of a class proceeding, the majority spends
a significant amount of time outlining the complexity of class proceedings and remarking on the amount of money at issue in such disputes, an approach also reflected by the majority in AT&T. 3 14
Furthermore, Justice Ginsburg suggests in her dissent in Stolt-Nielsen that the majority takes the view that "arbitrators ordinarily are
not equipped to manage class proceedings."3 1 5 This, of course, could
implicate the adjudicatory aspect of arbitration in that arbitral procedures must be "conducted in a manner which affords the parties an
opportunity to be heard in an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner."3 16 If the decision-maker is somehow unable or unqualified to act
in such a manner, then he or she may not be able to preside over an
"arbitration" per se.
Competency concerns can exist at two different levels. First,
problems may arise with respect to an individual arbitrator's qualifications. This issue usually relates to various requirements imposed
by the parties on the arbitrator (for instance, that the person be of a

311. Id. at 1775.
312. See supra notes 224-45.
313. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
314. See id. at 1776; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
1751-52 (2011).
315. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also AT&T,
131 S.Ct. at 1741 (stating that "[w]e find it unlikely that in passing the FAA Congress
meant to leave the disposition of these procedural requirements to an arbitrator").
316. See Born, supra note 5, at 253.
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certain nationality or hold certain commercial or professional qualifications) rather than any attributes imposed as a matter of law.3 1 7
Typically, the only legal requirements regarding arbitrator qualifications are that arbitrators demonstrate judicial qualities such as independence, impartiality, and (in most jurisdictions) neutrality.3 1 8
Notably, there is nothing in Stolt-Nielsen to suggest that any of
the issues in this first category of concerns were at stake.3 1 9 Instead,
statements about the inherent complexity of class proceedings seem
to raise a second type of competency concern involving the general
ability of arbitrators to handle matters of this type. 32 0
To some extent, this article has already addressed this issue,
with the earlier discussion concluding that there is nothing about the
number of parties or the amount in dispute that makes class arbitration inherently different from other types of multiparty proceedings. 32 1 However, something else seems to be at play here. Although
references are made to the size of the dispute, the Supreme Court
also appears to be insinuating that arbitrators are inherently unable
to handle particularly complex claims or matters touching on important questions of public policy, a charge that has been leveled against
different types of arbitration at various times over the years. 322 However, class arbitration has been in existence for thirty years, 323 and it

317. Arbitrators typically do not need to hold any special qualifications or undergo
special training. But see id. at 1447 (noting some additional requirements under some
national laws); id. at 1496-1501 (discussing U.S. move toward requiring neutrality).
318. See id. at 1461-64, 1496-1501.
319. To the contrary, Justice Ginsburg explicitly noted that the arbitrators in
question were very experienced. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1777 n.1 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
320. See id. at 1776.
321. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
322. See Stavros L. Brekoulakis, On Arbitrability:PersistingMisconceptions and
New Areas of Concern, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPEC-

TIVES 19, 19-32 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Stavros L. Brekoulakis eds., 2009); see also
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776; 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1471
(2009) (noting shift in judicial attitudes over time); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-34 (1985); BoRN, supra note 5, at 768; Jan
Paulsson, InternationalArbitration is Not Arbitration,2 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB. REV.
1, 10 (2008) (discussing 1944 Yale Law Journal article that condemns commercial
arbitration as violating the notion that arbitration was intended to be a simple means
of resolving the disputes of ordinary persons).
323. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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seems strange, if not disingenuous given existing precedent, to suggest now that arbitrators lack the competence to handle such matters. 3 2 4 Not only are such implications contrary to U.S. Supreme
Court precedent indicating that class arbitration is a permissible
form of dispute resolution, 32 5 but several commentators have noted
that arbitrators are "as well equipped as courts" to deal with the special procedural concerns associated with class arbitration.3 26
The Supreme Court's handling of this matter appears even more
unusual when one recalls that objections regarding the general competence of arbitrators to decide certain issues are usually analyzed
under the doctrine of arbitrability. 3 27 When considering whether a
claim is arbitrable, courts and arbitrators look at a number of factors,
including the extent to which public interests are at stake, whether
the dispute involves significant inequalities in bargaining power, the
effect of the decision on third-party rights, the ability of arbitrators to
grant legislatively required remedies, and legislative intent. 328
Courts may also consider whether arbitral procedures (as opposed to
judicial procedures) are adequate to resolve the dispute, although
"the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis" of some of the
early decisions on this issue has been deemed "difficult to square with
the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time."3 2 9
Indeed, the recent trend, particularly in the United States, has been
to broaden the definition of what is arbitrable and to consider arbitrators widely competent to handle even the most complex claims.3 3 0
324. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633 (noting that courts that allow certain complex
claims to go to arbitration pursuant to the parties' express agreement cannot later
claim that those matters are "inherently insusceptible to resolution by arbitration").
325. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
326. HANOTIAU, supra note 20, at 276; see also BORN, supra note 5, at 1232 n.442.
327. See Brekoulakis, supra note 322, at 26-32. The term "arbitrability" is used
here in its international rather than its domestic U.S. sense and therefore goes to
whether certain types of claims are amenable to arbitration as a general rule rather
than whether a dispute falls within the scope of a particular arbitration agreement.
See REDFERN AND HUNTER, supra note 82, 2.111. Interestingly, several circuit courts
consider the issue of class waivers under the substantive federal law of arbitrability
rather state law of unconscionability, thus perhaps limiting the impact of AT&T. See
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); In re Am. Express Merchs.'
Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2011).
328. See BoRN, supra note 5, at 789-90.
329. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987); see also
BORN, supra note 5, at 789 n.1155.
330. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-34 (1985); BoRN, supra note
5, at 783-85; Rau, supra note 169, at 209.
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Surprisingly, the doctrine is not discussed in Stolt-Nielsen, despite the fact that class arbitration touches on several of the factors
that are at issue in arbitrability determinations.3 3 1 Skeptics might
view this as a conscious decision to avoid troubling precedent that
supports the arbitrators' ability to handle procedurally and factually
complex claims that are in many ways similar to the types of issues
raised in Stolt-Nielsen,33 2 but there is another possible rationale.
Questions of arbitrability arise when the dispute involves matters
that the state wishes to reserve to itself and to the public dispute
resolution system (i.e., the courts).33 3 Thus, the Supreme Court may
have intentionally avoided mentioning arbitrability in Stolt-Nielsen
because invocation of that particular doctrine would have required
class disputes to proceed in state courts, and the right to proceed as a
class may not be a procedure that the Supreme Court wishes to
protect. 33 4
The question of arbitrability is particularly intriguing because of
the unique policy issues that arise in class arbitration. For example,
class suits implicate considerations regarding both access to justice
and deterrence. 3 3 5 Neither of these concerns is typically taken into
account in other forms of arbitration, which are seen as focusing primarily, if not exclusively, on matters affecting the parties to the immediate dispute. 3 36 However, arbitrators, particularly in the United
States, are in fact qualified to consider policy matters that carry social implications beyond the parties to the dispute and that even involve deterrent elements, even if the issue is not directly framed as

331. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). Of
course, this may be because "it is difficult to see what ... non-arbitrability objections
could be raised to class arbitrations." BORN, supra note 5, at 1232 n.442. This issue
was beyond the scope of the dispute in AT&T, so the Supreme Court's silence there is
understandable.
332. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758; 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct.
1456, 1471 (2009); Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 444 (plurality opinion) (assuming the arbitral
tribunal was competent to handle class claims); Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. at
232-33; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633-34 (involving antitrust claims in the international context).
333.

See LEW ET AL., supra note 6,

1

9-2.

334. A state could choose to protect the right to proceed as a class either by making class claims nonarbitrable (thus forcing their return to state court) or by making
the right to proceed as a class nonwaivable (thus allowing class claims to proceed
either in court or in arbitration). See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 634 F.3d
187, 194, 199 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a class waiver was void for public policy).
335. See supra notes 174-88 and accompanying text.
336. See id.
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such.33 7 Therefore, the social concerns that are at issue in class arbitration-though somewhat unique in terms of content-do not appear dissimilar enough from the policy issues resolved in other forms
of arbitration to allow a conclusion that class arbitration "changes
the nature of arbitration."33 8 Thus, concerns about arbitrator competence-whether framed as an individual or a general matter-appear
insufficient to call the legitimacy of class arbitration into question.
Nature of representative relief
The final adjudicatory concern to consider involves the nature of
representative relief, which, along with the policy considerations just
discussed, is one of the ways in which class arbitration deviates from
other, more established forms of multiparty arbitration.3 3 9 In order
to determine whether class arbitration "changes the nature of arbitration,"34 0 it is necessary to identify whether the provision of representative relief violates arbitration's adjudicatory element. In
particular, it must be considered whether the use of representative
relief in arbitration constitutes a "neutral, adjudicatory procedure[]
affording the parties an opportunity to be heard"34 1 and whether it
resolves the dispute in "an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner."3 42
As it turns out, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude that
the use of representative relief violates the adjudicative aspects of
arbitration in proceedings seated in the United States or governed by
U.S. law, for two reasons. First, representative relief is expressly permitted in U.S. courts for a wide range of substantive claims. Thus,
there can be no policy-based objections to this particular form of redress as a matter of U.S. law. What is more, the mechanisms used in
class arbitration are nearly identical to those used in judicial class
337. Antitrust/competition law claims are the clearest examples of this broad capability, but investment arbitration also involves public policy issues, widespread
ramifications, and deterrent elements, although the situation there is slightly different due to the presence of state parties and international treaties. See Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. at 629-40 (allowing arbitration of antitrust claims, despite the deterrent element
and implication of public interests); id. at 655 (noting antitrust claims, which are arbitrable, can affect "hundreds of thousands-perhaps millions-of people") (Stevens,
J., dissenting); LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 11 28-8 to 28-13; Szalai, supra note 15, at
421-25.
338. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
339. See supra notes 51-81, 164-96 and accompanying text.
340. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
341. BORN, supra note 5, at 217.
342. Id. at 253.
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actions.343 If class actions reflect a "neutral, adjudicatory procedure [ ]
affording the parties an opportunity to be heard,"3 44 as they undoubtedly do, then class arbitration must meet that standard as well. Indeed, this is one time when class arbitration's high degree of
formalism works to its benefit, since there is no way to argue that the
process is not conducted in "an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
manner."3 4 5
Secondly, the issue of arbitrability directly addresses the question of whether a particular type of claim is amenable to resolution in
arbitration, 3 46 and the Supreme Court has held that class claims are
arbitrable on several previous occasions. 34 7 Furthermore, as the Supreme Court recognized in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChrylserPlymouth, Inc., courts that allow certain complex claims to go to arbitration pursuant to the parties' express agreement cannot later claim
that those matters are "inherently insuceptible to resolution by arbitration."3 4 Thus, the representative nature of class arbitration cannot support a claim that class arbitration "changes the nature of
arbitration," 34 9 at least in the context of U.S. law, since the device
falls squarely within the definition of a proper adjudicatory mechanism as well as relevant precedent.
This does not mean that every jurisdiction would necessarily
reach a similar conclusion. As indicated above, some countries do not
permit parties to seek representative relief because of concerns about
the nature of certain fundamental rights.3 5 0 A court in one of those
states might very well conclude that representative relief in arbitration violates the adjudicatory requirement of arbitration, not because
the arbitral process was found lacking, but because the rights at issue cannot be adjudicated in either arbitration or litigation. In other
words, representative relief in those countries could fail to meet the
adjudicatory requirement in arbitration because no one-neither a

343. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23; AAA SUPPLEMENTARY RULES, supra note 17; JAMS
CLASs ACTION PROCEDURES, supra note 17.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
(1985).
349.
350.

BORN, supra note 5, at 217.
Id. at 253.
See id. at 789-90.
See supra notes 15-17, 250 and accompanying text.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'1 Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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court nor an arbitral tribunal-would be capable of rendering a binding decision on a representative claim.3 5 1 However, these sorts of objections are based on fundamental principles of other national laws
and cannot be transferred to arbitrations governed by U.S. law.352
Therefore, although representative relief constitutes a unique attribute of class arbitration, the provision of representative relief cannot
of itself constitute a cause for concluding that class arbitration
"changes the nature of arbitration."3 5 3
V.

CONCLUSION

Despite the perhaps common perception that class arbitration is
radically different from other forms of arbitration, class proceedings
in fact resemble traditional forms of multiparty arbitration in several
significant ways, including the number of parties, the amount in dispute, the relationship between the parties, and the method of selecting the arbitrators. 3 54 It is only with respect to two characteristicsthe provision of representative relief and the underlying policy rationales-that class arbitration can be said to be distinctive.3 5 5
However, a conclusion that class arbitration is unique in some
regards does not necessarily mean that the device "changes the nature of arbitration."35 6 The only way class arbitration could be said to
351. Notably, it is equally likely-and perhaps preferred, as a matter ofjurisprudence-that the issue would be considered under the concept of arbitrability, since
the law in that area is comparatively better developed than the law regarding the
nature of arbitration. See LEW ET AL., supra note 6, 1 9-2 to 9-3 (describing arbitrability). However, it has also been said that "it is difficult to see what . . . nonarbitrability objections could be raised to class arbitrations." BORN, supra note 5, at
1232 n.442. Indeed,
[tihe fact that class actions are not recognized or available in many national
litigation systems should not preclude the use of class action arbitrations
(just as the unavailability of documents only, fast-track, or similar dispute
resolution mechanisms in litigation does not invalidate arbitration agreements requiring such procedures). There may be requirements regarding
procedural regularity and an opportunity to be heard, imposed by national
law, but these would involve the implementation of the class action arbitration, not its basic enforceability.
Id.
352. See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 191, at 1 (noting arbitration "does not
always take the same form in different countries. Inevitably, each different form reflects local problems and sometimes a different approach to the entire legal system.").
353. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775; see supra notes 164-96 and accompanying
text.
354. See supra notes 44-50, 82-163 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 51-81, 164-96 and accompanying text.
356. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
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have such an effect is if it were not "a process by which parties consensually submit a dispute to a non-governmental decision-maker,
selected by or for the parties, to render a binding decision resolving a
dispute in accordance with neutral, adjudicatory procedures affording the parties an opportunity to be heard"3 5 7 or if the procedures
used were not "conducted in a manner which affords the parties an
opportunity to be heard in an adjudicatory or quasi-judicial manner."3 5 8 As it turns out, the two areas in which class arbitration differs most significantly from other forms of multiparty arbitrationthe provision of representative relief and the underlying policy rationales-meet the standards necessary for a procedure to be considered
"arbitration." Furthermore, other matters that have been raised on
occasion, including arguments that class arbitration involves excessive formalities and judicial involvement, as well as residual concerns
about arbitrator competence, are also unpersuasive as a means of
supporting the claim that class arbitration affects the fundamental
nature of arbitration.
This is not to say that there are no areas of concern. In particular, the level and type of judicial involvement in class arbitration at
times comes close to violating the requirement that arbitration utilize
a neutral, non-governmental adjudicator.3 5 9 While much will depend
on how the law involving the partial final award system develops,3 6 0
class arbitration, at the present moment, appears to fall within established parameters regarding arbitration. Nevertheless, the arbitral
community will need to keep a close watch as procedures regarding
the scope, standard, and availability of judicial review of partial final
awards develop, since this issue was specifically left open in StoltNielsen.3 6 1
Although some commentators have claimed that Stolt-Nielsen
and AT&T herald the end of class suits in both litigation and arbitration, 3 62 the battle over class arbitration will likely continue for some
time, reflecting the bitter debate that has been waged for years with
357. BORN, supra note 5, at 217. Notably, there is no requirement that the procedures be confidential. See supra note 220.
358. BORN, supra note 5, at 253.
359. See supra notes 288-313 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 225-45 and accompanying text.
361. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767 n.2; see also Strong, Opening More Doors,
supra note 236, at 567.
362. See Cole, supra note 259; Editorial, Gutting Class Action, N.Y. TIMES (May
12, 2011), available at www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/opinion/13fril.html; Kirgis,
supra note 259; Sternlight, supra note 259; supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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respect to judicial class actions.3 6 3 However, the issues in arbitration
are somewhat more complex. For example, the use of representative
relief not only gives rise to the due process concerns that lead to the
perceived need for increased judicial involvement, it also drives issues regarding the size and scope of the proceedings and the attendant desire for express secondary consent.
Experience in the judicial realm suggests that corporate respondents find representative actions both risky and expensive, and that
business interests are therefore inclined to do everything possible to
minimize or eliminate class relief in all possible forms. 36 4 However,
corporate concerns do not always align with larger social interests,
and there are numerous reasons why abandoning or curtailing the
class mechanism in arbitration would be problematic as a matter of
U.S. law and policy. 3 6 5 For example, one commentator has argued
that class relief is the price paid for an open, de-regulated commercial
environment, and the loss of the class device would likely lead to
more costs being imposed on businesses ex ante.3 6 6 Furthermore, if
corporations were to abandon their all-or-nothing strategy, they
might discover that they are better off with class arbitration than
with judicial class actions.3 6 7
Class arbitration is not without its challenges, and further consideration of numerous issues is necessary. However, as discussions
progress, it is important that courts and arbitrators understand the
first principles underlying arbitration so that class procedures can be
developed in ways that are consistent with established arbitral

363. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 32, at 9-47; Strong, Opening More Doors,
supra note 236, at 367.
364. See Smit, supra note 136, at 210-11; see also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 32,
at 15-47.
365. Although access to justice and deterrence of irresponsible corporate actors are
the two most often cited reasons to adopt class mechanisms, there are others as well.
See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); supra note 171 and
accompanying text.
366. See Burch, supra note 77, at 76-77.
367. Though more analysis is needed on this point, some initial thoughts can be
found in Dana H. Freyer & Gregory A. Litt, Desirabilityof InternationalClass Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2008, supra note 20, at 171; Smit, supra note 136,

at 210-12; Strong, Abaclat, supra note 32; S.I. Strong, Class and Collective Relief in
the Cross-Border Context: A Possible Role for the Permanent Court of Arbitration,23
THE HAGUE YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 2010, 113 (2011); Strong, De-Americanization, supra note 23, at 508.
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norms and standards. 3 68 While it is currently true that there is nothing about class arbitration that "changes the nature of arbitration,"3 69 it would be unfortunate if procedures were unknowingly
adopted that brought that conclusion into question.

368. For example, those who wish to give parties an opportunity to appeal certain
early decisions affecting the availability of class relief could contract for substantive
review through an arbitral appeal process rather than judicial review. See Reuben,
supra note 169, at 1139-40 (noting such procedures would not violate U.S. Supreme
Court precedent or fundamental principles of arbitration). Interestingly, although
corporate respondents have traditionally supported the right to appeal in the class
context, empirical evidence suggests that most appellate procedures are not to the
respondent's benefit. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of Rule 23
to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 170-71 (1996) (noting
plaintiffs are far more likely to appeal after losing a decision, suggesting that defendants seeking finality might be better off in a dispute resolution system (such as arbitration) that limits appeals).
369. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775.
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